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We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse
buyer and profit-maximizing sellers. When writing a long-term contract the parties
have to rely on renegotiations in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post.
The type of the concluded long-term contract affects the buyer’s expectations re-
garding the outcome of renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to
take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially efficient good ex
post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not
take place. In this case, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex
post. Based on the buyer’s expectation management, our theory provides a ratio-
nale for “employment contracts” in the absence of non-contractible investments.
Moreover, in an extension with non-contractible investments, we show that loss
aversion can reduce the hold-up problem.
JEL classification: C78; D03; D86
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the complexity of the respective trading environment, contracts observed in practice
are often relatively simple. A possible reason for this could be indescribable contingencies,
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which prevent the contracting parties from writing a fully state-dependent long-term contract.
Instead, parties write a simple state-independent “incomplete” contract—e.g., a sales contract
specifying a particular good to be delivered in the future by a seller to a buyer at a prespecified
price. With the state of the world being relevant for the buyer’s benefit from and the seller’s
cost for provision of a certain service, the parties then have to rely on renegotiations in order to
implement the efficient service ex post.
The standard approach of the incomplete contracting literature, which assumes that the parties
engage in efficient bargaining ex post à la Coase (1960) and therefore focuses on the ex ante
inefficiencies caused by contractual incompleteness, recently has been challenged by behavioral
approaches—most notably by Hart and Moore (2008).1 Hart and Moore were the first to point
out that the initial contract can shape a reference point for the parties which affects the ex
post outcome. We built on this main idea by positing that the buyer has reference-dependent
preferences and that his reference point is affected by the concluded long-term contract. In
contrast to Hart and Moore, our analysis has a strong focus on the outcome of renegotiations,
which ever since have played a crucial role in the standard theory on incomplete contracts. In
particular, we are interested in how the expectations regarding whether renegotiations will take
place as well as regarding their outcome affects the likelihood of renegotiations to take place and
their efficiency. We posit that the buyer is expectation-based loss averse according to Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006). The buyer’s reference point at the renegotiation stage is fully determined by
his rational expectations formed ex ante when writing the long-term contract. Importantly, the
long-term contract does not directly shape but indirectly influences the buyer’s reference point
by narrowing down his expectations regarding the outcome of renegotiations. If renegotiations
take place, then this is perfectly anticipated by the parties. While this is a strong assumption,
we believe that in situations where renegotiations are typically necessary in order to implement
the efficient service it is reasonable to assume that the parties anticipate renegotiations to some
degree and that this in turn is incorporated in their reference points.2
We consider a simple trading relationship where at some point in the future a buyer requires
a service, which can be delivered by one of two sellers. The buyer can either sign a long-term
contract today without knowing the ex post efficient service or engage in spot contracting in the
future after the state of nature has been materialized. Ex ante there is competition between the
sellers for the buyer. Ex post, when the long-term contract is renegotiated or spot contracting
takes place the two parties face bilateral monopoly—i.e., within the time horizon a fundamental
transformation in the sense of Williamson (1985) takes place.3 The novelty of our paper is
1 For a synthesis of the classic literature on incomplete contracts see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
2Casual evidence that the expectations regarding whether renegotiations will take place affect the parties willing-
ness indeed to renegotiate the contract ex post is that in some industries renegotiations are common while in
others they are not. For instance, analyzing concession contracts in Latin American and Caribbean Countries,
Guasch (2004) finds that roughly 75% of the water and sanitation concession contracts were renegotiated while
less than 10% of the concession contracts in the electricity sector were renegotiated.
3A potential story is the following told by Hart and Moore (2008). The buyer organizes a wedding and the seller
operates a catering service. Half a year before the wedding takes place there are many caterers, while a week
before the wedding it is hard to find a new caterer. Even if the buyer does not sign a long-term contract ex ante,
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to assume that the buyer is expectation-based loss averse à la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). The
buyer forms ex ante rational expectations about trade ex post, which shape a reference point for
him separately in the “value” and the “price” dimension. In other words, the buyer feels a loss
ex post if the price he has to pay exceeds his reference price or if the value he obtains from the
delivered service is below his reference value. The buyer can be thought of as a layperson who
engages in contracting and renegotiating only infrequently and suffers from loss aversion. The
sellers, on the other hand, are assumed to be profit-maximizing professional traders who are
used to trade and negotiate and do not suffer from loss aversion.4
Regarding the form that long-term contracts may take, we follow the traditional approach
of Simon (1951) and compare a sales contract to an employment contract. A sales contract
specifies a particular service to be delivered at a fixed price. Under an employment contract
the price is also specified but one party is designated to freely choose the service within some
specified limits. According to Simon, the advantage of an employment contact is rooted in
its flexibility, whereas its disadvantage is that the party who is allowed to choose may exploit
her/his trading partner. Usually it is argued, however, that the argument put forth by Simon is
incomplete because it ignores the possibility of renegotiations. If Coasian bargaining is feasible
ex post, there is no difference between these two types of long-term contracts.5 We show that
in our setup these two types of contracts do not lead to the same expected gains from trade and
thus indeed differ. The reason is that two kinds of inefficiencies may arise ex post. First, with
the buyer being loss averse, efficient renegotiations do not always take place. Second, even if
the efficient service is traded ex post, the losses incurred by the buyer depend on the concluded
long-term contract—i.e, the necessary adjustment in prices during renegotiations can differ.
We establish that, irrespective of the type of the concluded long-term contract, if the buyer
expects efficient renegotiations and this is correctly anticipated by the seller, then it is indeed
optimal for the buyer to accept materially efficient renegotiations ex post—i.e., this constitutes a
consistent plan. In other words, there always exists—as we will call it, borrowing the language
of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)—a subgame-perfect personal equilibrium (SP-PE) in which ef-
ficient renegotiations take place. Thus, in contrast to the conventional belief that loss aversion
causes contractual stickiness, we show that this is not necessary the case if the reference point
is determined by rational expectations.
Due to the self-fulfilling prophecy nature of the personal equilibrium (PE) concept, the equi-
librium often is not unique. If this is the case, adopting the notion of preferred personal equilib-
rium (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006), we presume that the buyer selects the plan among all credible
plans that maximizes his expected utility. We call the equilibrium in which sellers correctly an-
ticipate this expectation formation of the buyer subgame-perfect preferred personal equilibrium
he may reach an informal agreement with one seller so that there is a bilateral monopoly ex post.
4List (2011) points out that laypersons are affected more intensively by loss aversion than professional traders
who are more used to trade and renegotiate.
5If the parties can make relationship-specific investments, the performance of sales contracts and employment
contracts is different even when Coasian bargaining takes place—see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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(SP-PPE). In the SP-PPE efficient renegotiation does not always take place—in particular when
the buyer is highly loss averse. The intuition is as follows. Suppose the default outcome—i.e.,
the outcome if renegotiations fail—gives the buyer a higher value than the efficient service. If
the buyer expects the service to be efficiently renegotiated, then he also expects a reduction in
the trade price. This, in turn, makes him willing to accept the efficient service for a price reduc-
tion which is lower than his reduction in value in order to avoid a loss in the price dimension
if renegotiations fail. With the bilateral monopoly structure ex post, the buyer in this sense is
exposed to opportunism by the seller. Thus, for a given long-term contract, the buyer prefers ex
ante that renegotiations do not take place in these situations. These expectations are credible,
however, only if the buyer is sufficiently loss averse. With regard to sales contracts, we show
that efficient renegotiations are more likely if the buyer is only mildly loss averse and if the
environment is fairly uncertain. The latter finding is in line with Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007),
who show that being exposed to background risk makes a loss-averse decision maker less risk
averse.
The ex ante optimal contract maximizes the expected surplus of the two parties including the
buyer’s expected losses. We show that the optimal long-term contract typically is an employ-
ment contract that gives a sufficiently high degree of discretion (in form of a large acceptance
set) to the party that is designated to choose. The advantage of an employment contract with
much discretion compared to contracts with little discretion, a sales contract in particular, is that
it leads to less variations in the default outcome and thus also less variations in the ex post out-
come. We thus provide a rationale for employment contracts in the absence of non-contractible
investments.
Whether a buyer or a seller employment contract is optimal depends on the precise nature of
the achievable costs and benefits. Suppose the gains from trading the buyer’s preferred good
are relatively high, while the gains from trading the seller’s preferred good are relatively low.
As outlined before, a highly loss-averse buyer might prefer to expect renegotiations not to take
place. This is attractive under a buyer employment contract but less so under a seller employ-
ment contract where the losses in material gains from trade are severe. As a consequence, a
buyer employment contract with much discretion results in frequent trade of a service of inef-
ficiently high quality. Under a seller employment contract, the default outcome leads to very
low material gains from trade and thus expecting renegotiations not to take place might not be
a credible plan for the buyer. In this scenario, an employment contract that gives the seller a
lot of discretion is uniquely optimal. Note that renegotiations here require that the price in-
creases because the default service minimizes the seller’s cost. Conventional wisdom, however,
seems to suggest that under loss aversion prices should be rather sticky because customers
should severely suffer from losses in the money dimension in form of price increases. We show
that this reasoning is incorrect if the customers are expectation-based loss averse and rationally
anticipate that the price will increase. Thus, loss aversion can accommodate the observation
that prices often increase after renegotiations—e.g., the ultimate bill of a craftsman often being
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higher than the initially specified price.
In a second step, we extend our model by allowing the buyer to make a relationship-specific
and non-contractible investment in the sense of Hart and Moore (1988). In our benchmark
model the parties write a long-term contract because there is a change in the buyer’s bargaining
position. With relationship-specific investments a long-term contract is needed in order to pro-
tect the buyer’s sunk investment against ex post opportunism by the seller. We show that loss
aversion can reduce the hold-up problem, i.e., investment incentives can be increasing in the
degree of loss aversion. This result is not due to the fact that loss aversion makes renegotiations
harder. In fact, it occurs in cases where efficient renegotiation takes place. The loss-averse
buyer is exploited by the seller whenever the original long-term contract is renegotiated ex post.
This exploitation, however, is reduced if the buyer undertakes the investment. This explains
why investment incentives can be increasing in the degree of loss aversion. If the buyer is suffi-
ciently loss averse, however, not undertaking the investment can become a commitment for the
buyer not to renegotiate the contract ex post, which protects him from ex post opportunism by
the seller. This, in turn, leads to lower investment incentives with a loss-averse buyer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Before introducing the model in Section
2, we briefly discuss the related literature. The model is solved in Section 3. We start by an-
alyzing spot contracting in Subsection 3.1. In order to analyze the outcome of renegotiations,
we first describe the default outcome in Subsection 3.2 and thereafter—in Subsection 3.3—we
characterize some general properties of a SP-PE. The outcome of renegotiations for sales con-
tracts and employment contracts are characterized in Subsections 3.4 to 3.6. Optimal long-term
contracts are analyzed in Subsection 3.7. Non-contractible investments and the arising hold-up
problem are considered in Section 4. The final Section 5 summarizes our main findings and
critically discusses some of the simplifying assumptions we impose. All proofs are relegated
to Appendix A but proofs of purely technical results are relegated to Appendix B. Appendix C
provides a precise formal definition of our equilibrium concept.
Related literature.—The theory of the firm and the literature on incomplete contracts goes
back to Coase (1937), with the first formal model being found in Simon (1951). The modern
game theoretic approaches, beginning with Grout (1984), abstract from ex post inefficiencies
and focus on the ex ante inefficiencies caused by the hold-up problem, as introduced by Klein et
al. (1978).6 One important strand of this modern literature investigates how property rights can
be used to allocate the bargaining power ex post and thereby to enhance investment incentives
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). If specific performance contracts are fea-
sible, option contracts are an alternative to the allocation of property rights in order to restore
investment incentives (Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995). As pointed out by Hart and Moore (2008,
p.2) “the emphasis on noncontractible ex ante investments seems overplayed” in this literature.
In our model the achieved surplus of the different types of long-term contracts differ even in the
6Transaction costs as introduced and discussed by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) are another source of ineffi-
ciencies caused by incomplete contracts.
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absence of non-contractible investments.
The seminal contribution by Hart and Moore (2008) posits that a contract provides a reference
point for the parties’ feelings of entitlements ex post.7 A party who feels shortchanged (relative
to what she feels entitled to given the possible outcomes permitted by the contract) shades on
performance, which leads to an ex post inefficiency. Hart and Moore focus on the trade-off
arising between contractual rigidity and flexibility. Compared to a flexible contract, a rigid
contract reduces the parties’ desire to shade by leaving little room for disagreement over which
party is entitled to what share of the rents. In contrast to a flexible contract, however, a rigid
contract does not allow for an adjustment of contractual terms in the light of new information.
This theory is then used by Hart (2009) to shed new light on the optimal allocation of ownership
rights and indexing contracts, by Hart and Holmstrom (2010) to investigate the boundaries of
the firm, and by Hart (2013) to reconsider non-contractible investments and the arising hold-up
problem.8 All the aforementioned papers do not analyze contract renegotiation, which is at the
heart of our analysis. The Hart-Moore approach is extended by Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart
(2013) in order to allow for renegotiation. They discuss examples under which the Hart-Moore
approach can accommodate why parties leave contracts deliberately incomplete.
The Hart-Moore approach is based on several behavioral assumptions. Next to reference
dependent preferences the parties have a self-serving bias and feel entitled to the best possible
outcome the contract in place allows for. Moreover, the parties behave reciprocally in the sense
that they can reduce their respective feelings of aggrievement by reducing the other party’s
utility from trade.9 While both our model as well as Hart and Moore’s model create scope for
ex post inefficiencies, in our model this ex post inefficiency is rooted purely in the expectation-
based loss aversion of the buyer without any notion of self-serving bias or social preferences.
The paper closest related to our work is Herweg and Schmidt (2013).10 Both papers consider
specific performance contracts and analyze how loss aversion affects the outcome of renegotia-
tions ex post. While Herweg and Schmidt posit that the reference point at the renegotiation stage
directly corresponds to the default outcome determined by the initial contract, we posit that it
is determined by rational expectations formed ex ante and thus is affected by the initial contract
only indirectly. Thus, both papers take an extreme—but complementary—view regarding how
the long-term contract shapes the reference point. The main focus of Herweg and Schmidt is on
ex post inefficiencies caused by loss aversion. They show that loss aversion makes the renego-
tiated outcome sticky and inefficient, i.e., the delivered service and the price are insufficiently,
if at all, adjusted to the realized state of nature. Furthermore, Herweg and Schmidt explore the
implications of their theory for optimal long-term contracting and the allocation of ownership
7See also Hart and Moore (2007).
8A similar approach is used by Mori (2012) in order to explain why an authority relationship is more efficient
than a contract in the presence of ex post adaption problems.
9Laboratory evidence for these assumptions is provided by Fehr et al. (2011a). See also Fehr et al. (2009), Fehr
et al. (2011b), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2011).
10The experimental findings obtained by Bartling and Schmidt (2013) are in line with the predictions made by
Herweg and Schmidt (2013).
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rights. The focus of our study is how expectations affect the parties’ willingness to renegotiate
and the outcome of renegotiations, which is not an issue in Herweg and Schmidt.
Finally, the paper is related to the recent and growing literature dealing with expectation-
based loss aversion. Evidence for reference points being (at least partially) shaped by expecta-
tions is found in both laboratory data (Abeler et al., 2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Gill and
Prowse, 2012; Karle et al., 2012; Banerji and Gupta, 2014) as well as field data (Crawford and
Meng, 2011; Bartling et al., 2013). Beginning with Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008), expectation-
based loss aversion à la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is applied to models of industrial
organization (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014; Herweg and Mierendorff, 2013; Karle and Peitz,
forthcoming; Karle, 2013; Rosato, 2013), contract design (Herweg et al., 2010; Macera, 2011;
Daido and Murooka, 2013; Daido et al., 2013), mechanism design (Eisenhuth, 2012; Hahn et
al., 2012), and inventory management (Herweg, 2013).
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Trading Environment
We consider an incomplete contracting environment similar to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
A buyer (he) requires a service which can be provided by one of two sellers (she). The nature
of the service will be commonly known when trade takes place but is unknown to the parties
ex ante when they may write a long-term contract. There are n kinds of the service that each
seller can deliver, x ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ≡ X and there are n equiprobable states of the world,
θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θn} ≡ Θ. We assume that n ≥ 3 is odd. The buyer’s benefit and a seller’s cost
from service x ∈ X being traded in state θ ∈ Θ is denoted by v(x, θ) and c(x, θ), respectively.
Trade of service x in state θ can result in three different benefit-cost combinations,
(v(x, θ), c(x, θ)) ∈ {(v0, c0), (vL, cL), (vH , cH)}, (1)
where
0 ≡ v0 < vL < vH , 0 ≡ c0 < cL < cH , 0 < vH − cH < vL − cL. (2)
Trading the good that leads to the low-value/low-cost outcome maximizes the material gains
from trade ex post. Henceforth, the outcome (vL, cL) will be called “materially efficient”. In
state θi ∈ Θ service xi is the unique service that results in the materially efficient outcome.
Furthermore, in any state θi ∈ Θ there exist services xj and xk different from xi that result in
the high-value outcome and the worthless outcome, respectively. Formally, for each θi ∈ Θ,
v(x, θi) = vL if and only if x = xi, v(xj, θi) = vH for some xj 6= xi, and v(xk, θi) = 0 for some
xk 6= xi, xj . Finally, ex ante each service x ∈ X is equally likely to result in the high-value
outcome or the worthless outcome.11
11The symmetry assumption regarding materially inefficient outcomes and the assumption of a unique materially
efficient service are merely imposed in order to simplify the exposition. Any of these assumptions can be
relaxed, which would also allow for considering an even number of states.
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In order to reduce the number of cases that need to be considered, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. vL > max{2cL, vH/2}
2.2. Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Sequence of Events
Over the lifetime of the trading relationship, sellers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the
buyer and the buyer can at any time be involved in at most one contractual relationship. At
date 0, sellers simultaneously and non-cooperatively make contract offers to the buyer. The
state of the world is not verifiable and thus cannot be contracted upon.12 A long-term contract
offer CE,A(p¯) specifies an acceptance set A ⊆ X from which party E ∈ {B, S} is designated
to freely choose service x ∈ A to be delivered at price p¯ ∈ R. This contractual arrangement
thus represents a buyer employment contract for E = B, and a seller employment contract for
E = S. IfA is a singleton, the offered contract is a simple sales contract specifying a particular
service to be delivered at a pre-specified price.
At date 1, upon receiving both sellers’ offers, the buyer decides whether to accept one of these
offers or to reject them all. In the case of rejection, which we denote by C = ∅, contracting is
deferred to date 4. In order to make this decision, the buyer forms rational expectations about
the value of the service he will ultimately consume and about the price he has to pay for it. For
a loss-averse buyer these rational expectations formed at date 1 shape a reference point. The
reference point affects the buyer’s evaluation of renegotiation or spot contracting at date 4. We
will explain this in more detail below.
At date 2, upon observing the buyer’s decision, each seller has to decide whether she stays
in the market or pursues a fleeting outside option, which is no longer available after date 2.
If a seller chooses to leave the market, she obtains pi > 0 but close to zero. After date 2,
each seller’s outside option equals zero. A seller whose offer was accepted by the buyer at
date 1 cannot leave the market anymore because she is committed to the trading relationship.
Sellers make the decision whether to leave the market simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
Afterward, each seller observes how many sellers remain in the market.
At date 3, the state of the world, θ ∈ Θ, materializes and is observed by all parties. At
date 4, if the buyer accepted one of the initial contract offers, renegotiation takes place with
the respective seller offering a renegotiated contract (xR, pR) ∈ X × R to the buyer. If the
buyer rejected all the original contract offers, each seller who did not leave the market makes a
take-it-or-leave-it spot contract offer (xspot, pspot) ∈ X × R.
If the buyer signed a long-term contract, at date 5, he decides whether to accept the seller’s
renegotiation offer. Otherwise, the buyer decides which (if any) of the spot contract offers to
accept. Finally, at date 6 the service of the concluded contract at date 5 is delivered at the
specified price and costs and benefits are realized. If the buyer rejected all contract offers made
12We presume that the parties cannot use a third party to make the state verifiable as in Maskin (1999).
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Figure 1: Sequence of events
at date 1 and date 4, all parties receive a material payoff of zero but sellers who left the market
at date 2.13,14
Regarding the buyer’s decisions at date 1 and at date 4, we assume the following tie-breaking
rules: If the buyer is indifferent between accepting an offer and rejecting one or more offers, the
buyer accepts the offer. When being indifferent which contract offer to accept, the buyer picks
one offer at random with equal probability.15 Throughout the analysis we focus on equilibria in
pure strategies. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1.
2.3. Buyer’s Preferences and Seller’s Profit
The buyer is expectation-based loss averse according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and
his utility has two components: material utility and loss utility. Material utility from consuming
x in state θ at price p is v(x, θ) − p. Loss utility is derived by comparing the outcome in a
particular dimension, “value” or “money”, to its respective reference level. The reference point
for a given dimension, which is determined by rational expectations formed at the end of date
1, is independent across the two dimensions and typically stochastic. At date 4, the buyer takes
these expectations as given and both the renegotiation or spot contract offer are evaluated in
comparison to this reference point, where losses are evaluated separately in both dimensions.
Specifically, when the buyer accepts a long-term contract offer CE,A(p¯) at date 1, he forms
expectations regarding the outcome of renegotiation with the seller whose contract he signed.
With our focus on pure strategies, the buyer’s expectations under long-term contract CE,A(p¯)
about the outcome and the trade price implemented at date 5 if state θ ∈ Θ is realized comprise
13Regarding the time elapsed between two different points in time we have the following in mind. First the
parties meet and may write a long term contract (date 0 – date 2). This happens all within a short period of
time. Thereafter, between date 2 and date 3 quite some time elapses. After the state of the world has been
materialized, the parties renegotiate the contract (date 3 – date 5), which again happens within a relative short
period.
14The assumption that the buyer does not update his reference point after observing the state of nature at date
3 allows us to sidestep the issue of paper losses in the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). In Herweg and
Schmidt (2013) the parties form their reference point after observing the materialized state of nature.
15Regarding spot contracting we impose an additional tie-breaking rule in order to simplify some proofs. If the
buyer is indifferent between two distinct offers both of which he would rather accept than reject, the buyer
chooses the offer involving the higher value.
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a single value-cost pair
(vˆ(θ, CE,A(p¯)), pˆ(θ, CE,A(p¯))). (3)
Define
Λ(CE,A(p¯)) ≡ {(vˆ(θ, CE,A(p¯)), pˆ(θ, CE,A(p¯)))}θ∈Θ (4)
as buyer’s set of expectations, comprising of n value-price pairs, regarding the outcome of
renegotiations. If the buyer rejects all the contract offers at date 1,C = ∅, he forms expectations
about the outcome that spot contracting will take. With sellers observing the state of the world
at the time of their spot contract offers, the buyer expects the sellers’ offers to depend on the
state of the world. The buyer expects spot contracting in state θ ∈ Θ to result in a particular
value to be delivered at a particular price,
(vˆ(θ,∅), pˆ(θ,∅)). (5)
Note that the buyer expecting to reject all spot contract offers in state θ ∈ Θ corresponds to
(vˆ(θ,∅), pˆ(θ,∅)) = (0, 0). The buyer’s complete set of expectations regarding spot contracting
is denoted by
Λ(∅) ≡ {(vˆ(θ,∅), pˆ(θ,∅))}θ∈Θ. (6)
For given expectations Λ(C), with C ∈ {CE,A(p¯),∅}, the buyer’s overall utility at date 5 if
the seller delivers a service resulting in value v at price p is
U(v, p|Λ(C))
= v − p− 1
n
· λ ·
{ ∑
{θ∈Θ|vˆ(θ,C)>v}
[vˆ(θ, C)− v] +
∑
{θ∈Θ|pˆ(θ,C)<p}
[p− pˆ(θ, C)]
}
. (7)
For simplicity, we abstract from any gain utility and the weight on losses is λ ≥ 0.16 Here, λ
captures both the buyer’s degree of reference dependence and his magnitude of loss aversion.
Following the literature, we assume that the weight the buyer places on loss utility does not
exceed the weight placed on material utility (Herweg et al., 2010).
Assumption 2 (no dominance of loss utility). λ ≤ 1
In contrast to the buyer, the sellers are risk and loss neutral. At date 5, a seller’s profit from
delivering a service which costs c at price p is
Π(c, p) = p− c. (8)
16This assumption—which is also imposed by de Meza and Webb (2007) and Herweg and Mierendorff (2013)—
has no qualitative effects on our results.
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Equilibrium concept.—If the buyer is not loss averse, we apply the standard notion of sub-
game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. For a loss-averse buyer we augment the concept
of subgame perfect equilibrium by incorporating that the buyer’s behavior has to be a personal
equilibrium (PE) as defined in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). The PE requires that the buyer’s
expectations formed at date 1 (initial contracting) are such that his behavior at date 5 (renegoti-
ation or spot contracting) is consistent with his lagged expectations. At date 5 the buyer simply
selects the option among the available ones that maximizes his utility for the given reference
point formed at date 1. The available options at date 5 are dependent on the sellers’ behavior. In
equilibrium sellers correctly anticipate the buyer’s reference point, i.e., the offer of each seller at
date 4 takes the buyer’s reference point formed at date 1 into account. At date 1, when forming
his expectations, the buyer correctly anticipates that the sellers will optimally react on this ref-
erence point at date 4. Moreover, PE embodies the consistency criterion that the buyer can only
form plans that he will follow through. We will call an equilibrium of the type described above
subgame perfect personal equilibrium (SP-PE). Due to the self-fulfilling prophecy nature of the
PE concept, there are typically multiple PE, which in turn implies that there are often multiple
SP-PE. In this case, at date 1 the buyer is assumed to choose the plan among all consistent plans
that gives him the highest expected utility, i.e., the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) in the
language of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). We call the corresponding equilibrium in which sellers
correctly anticipate this behavior of the buyer as subgame perfect preferred personal equilib-
rium (SP-PPE). A precise definition of our equilibrium concept is provided in the Appendix
C.
2.4. Benchmark Case without Loss Aversion
As a benchmark, consider the case where the buyer is not loss averse and his behavior is solely
determined by material considerations. First, assume the buyer rejected all contract offers at
date 1 and thus spot contracting takes place at date 4. If both sellers are active at date 4, then
there is Bertrand competition which is associated with zero profits for both sellers. With each
seller’s outside option being strictly positive at date 2, two sellers staying in the market after date
2 is incompatible with pure-strategy subgame perfection. Hence, only a single seller is active
on the spot market. This seller will charge a price that makes the buyer just indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the offer, i.e., pspot = vspot. Furthermore, the seller will propose the
service that leads to the highest gains from trade, i.e., vspot = vL.
Now, suppose the buyer accepted some seller’s long-term contract CE,A(p¯) at date 1. At date
4, for any realized state θi, the parties will always agree upon trading the materially efficient
good xi. The initial contract only determines the parties outside option and therefore the nec-
essary adjustment of the price. In other words, the precise structure of the long-term contract is
irrelevant. With both sellers being active at date 1, the sellers compete with their long-term con-
tract offers for the buyer in a Bertrand fashion, i.e., each seller makes the best feasible contract
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offer to the buyer that allows her to obtain a profit equal to her fleeting outside option.
Observation 1. Suppose the buyer is not loss averse. Both sellers offer long-term contracts that
result in profits equal to pi and will be accepted by the buyer with probability 1/2. The long-term
contract offers can take any form, e.g., sales contract, buyer employment contract, and seller
employment contract. The buyer’s expected utility is vL − cL − pi.
Our model presumes that there is perfect competition between sellers at date 1 and that com-
petition is significantly reduced at date 4. In fact we assume that there is a bilateral monopoly
and that the seller has all the bargaining power at date 4. A long-term contract protects the buyer
against being exploited by a monopolist at date 4, and therefore is observed in all subgame-
perfect equilibria.
3. THE ANALYSIS
We start by analyzing the spot contracting subgame. Before analyzing the renegotiation sub-
game and long-term contracting, we introduce some notation and some preliminary results. The
analysis, thereafter, is conducted separartely for different sizes of the acceptance set.
3.1. Spot Contracting
If the buyer rejects all long-term contract offers at date 1, only one seller will stay in the market
after date 2. As we will show below, the seller staying in the market makes a profit that exceeds
her fleeting outside option pi > 0.
First, note that the buyer expecting the outcome of spot contracting to depend on the state of
the world is incompatible with SP-PE. In other words, in any SP-PE we have (vˆ(θ,∅), pˆ(θ,∅)) =
(vspot, pspot) for all θ ∈ Θ. Intuitively, with the buyer’s expectations being fixed from date 1
onward, all states of the world are ex post identical and (generically) the seller is harmed from
doing different things in different states.
Now, suppose the buyer expects to purchase a service resulting in value vspot ∈ {vL, vH} at
price pspot. The buyer’s utility from rejecting the seller’s spot contract offer is −λvspot. Thus,
if the seller offers to deliver a service resulting in value vspot at a price p ≥ pspot, the buyer
is still willing to accept this offer as long as vspot − p − λ(p − pspot) ≥ −λvspot. With the
seller charging the highest acceptable price and with expectations being met in equilibrium,
pspot = (1 + λ)vspot is the only price consistent with the buyer expecting to purchase a service
resulting in value vspot. The buyer’s resulting utility is −λvspot.
Consider the case where the buyer expects to obtain value vL, i.e. (vspot, pspot) = (vL, (1 +
λ)vL). Obviously, the seller cannot benefit from a deviation to offering a worthless service
instead, which would be accepted by the buyer only for a negative price. While the buyer would
accept a high-value service at price p ≥ pspot as long as vH − p − λ(p − pspot) ≥ −λvL, this
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deviation is not profitable for the seller even for the highest price still accepted by the buyer,
p = [vH + λ(2 + λ)vL]/(1 + λ).
Finally, note that outcome (vspot, pspot) = (0, 0) is incompatible with equilibrium. In this
case the seller could profitably deviate by offering delivery of the materially efficient service at
price p = vL/(1 +λ). At this price the buyer is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the seller’s contract offer and the seller makes a strictly positive profit, vL/(1 + λ) − cL, that
exceeds her outside option.
Hence, a spot-contracting equilibrium with (vspot, pspot) = (vL, (1+λ)vL) always exists. The
buyer’s utility in this equilibrium is higher than in a possibly existing equilibrium in which he
expects to obtain a high-value service.17
Proposition 1. Suppose the buyer rejected all contract offers at date 1. The spot contracting
SP-PPE consists of Λ(∅) = {(vL, (1 + λ)vL)}θ∈Θ and only one seller staying in the market.
3.2. Further Notation—Default Outcome
In order to characterize the outcome of renegotiation, it is important to know what the outcome
is if renegotiations fail. Let
(vD(θ, C), cD(θ, C)) (9)
denote the “default” value-cost pair that will be implemented under contract C = CE,A(p¯) if
renegotiation breaks down (or is not offered in the first place) after state θ ∈ Θ is realized.
While for E = S the seller will choose a service resulting in the minimum cost feasible given
set A, for E = B the buyer will opt for a service that results in the highest possible value given
set A. Let
Θk(E,A) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|(vD(θ, C), cD(θ, C)) = (vk, ck)} (10)
represent the set of all states that are associated with default outcome (vk, ck), where k ∈
{0, L,H}, given that party E ∈ {B, S} is designated to choose from set A. Letting
Qk(E,A) = Pr(θ ∈ Θk(E,A)) = |Θk(E,A)|
n
(11)
denote the ex ante probability that contract CE,A(p¯) results in default outcome (vk, ck), we have
QH(B,A) = Q0(S,A) =
 1 if |A| >
n+1
2
1− s+1
n
if |A| = n+1
2
− s for s ∈ {0, . . . , n−1
2
}
(12)
QL(B,A) = QL(S,A) =
 0 if |A| >
n+1
2
1
n
if |A| ≤ n+1
2
(13)
17A spot-contracting equilibrium with vspot = vH and pspot = (1+λ)vH exists if λ ≥ [(cH−cL)/(vH−vL)]−1.
Assuming that spot contracting always leads to trade of the materially efficient service has no impact on the
long-term contracts offered at date 1 in a SP-PE.
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and
Q0(B,A) = QH(S,A) =
 0 if |A| ≥
n+1
2
s
n
if |A| = n+1
2
− s for s ∈ {1, . . . , n−1
2
}.
(14)
We refer to acceptance sets of size |A| > (n + 1)/2, which contain both the high-value and
the worthless outcome for sure, as large. An acceptance set of seize |A| = (n + 1)/2, which
guarantees the buyer a default value of at least vL and the seller a default cost of at most cL, is
referred to as medium. Acceptance sets of size |A| < (n+ 1)/2 are referred to as small.
3.3. Preliminary Analysis
We begin with some basic observations regarding the buyer’s expectations concerning renego-
tiation when he accepted a long-term contractC = CE,A(p¯) offered at date 0. The buyer expect-
ing renegotiations not to occur if state θ ∈ Θ has been realized corresponds to (vˆ(θ, C), pˆ(θ, C)) =
(vD(θ, C), p¯).
Lemma 1. Generically, in a SP-PE, for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ with θ′ 6= θ′′, if vD(θ′, C) = vD(θ′′, C),
then (vˆ(θ′, C), pˆ(θ′, C)) = (vˆ(θ′′, C), pˆ(θ′′, C)).
According to Lemma 1, the buyer’s expectations regarding the outcome of renegotiations
in state θ ∈ Θ is fully determined by this state’s default outcome. Intuitively, from (7) it
follows that the buyer’s utility from obtaining value v at price p does not depend on the state
of the world per se. Therefore, when contemplating whether to accept or reject the seller’s
renegotiation offer, only the buyer’s default outcome matters but not the state of the world in
which this default outcome is brought about. Therefore, (generically) the seller is harmed by
making different renegotiation offers in different states with the same default outcome, which
is anticipated by the buyer.
To state the following observations concisely, let (vˆk, pˆk) (with k ∈ {0, L,H}) denote the
buyer’s expectations regarding renegotiations for state θ ∈ Θ with default outcome vD(θ, C) =
vk. A first observation is that if renegotiation occurs for default outcome vk, then the seller’s
renegotiation offer makes the buyer just indifferent between the default outcome at price p¯
and the renegotiated outcome at price pˆk. Next, whenever the buyer expects renegotiations to
result in a higher value than the default outcome, vˆk > vk, he has to expect to pay a markup
pˆk− p¯ > 0—facing a strict increase in cost, the seller would never offer a price below the initial
price p¯. Finally, if the buyer expects renegotiation to result in a lower value than the initial
contract, vˆk < vk, he has to expect a price reduction pˆk < p¯—when offered lower value at a
higher price, the buyer himself would be strictly better off by rejecting renegotiation.
The further analysis of the outcome of renegotiations can involve numerous case-by-case
analyses. For example, a small acceptance set (e.g., a sales contract) allows for three different
default outcomes such that the buyer’s beliefs are represented by a triplet of value-price pairs,
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Λ(C) = {(vˆ0, pˆ0) , (vˆL, pˆL) , (vˆH , pˆH)}. With three possible outcomes to renegotiate to, in
principle the buyer might expect 33 = 27 different outcomes of renegotiation. The following
lemmas are helpful in order to reduce the number of cases that need to be distinguished.
First, we can rule out that the worthless service is traded ex post. This is due to Assumptions 1
and 2, which ensure that the gains from materially efficient trade are sufficiently large compared
to the potential losses.
Lemma 2. In any SP-PE, vˆ0 > 0.
While Lemma 2 allows us to narrow down the form a SP-PE may take, the logic underlying
its proof allows to draw also important off-equilibrium path implications.
Corollary 1. Deviating from the buyer’s expectations by offering renegotiations to a worthless
service is never profitable for the seller.
With the increase in value being higher when moving from a worthless service to the low-
value service than when moving from the low-value service to a high-value service, we obtain
the following result regarding the renegotiated prices.
Lemma 3. In any SP-PE, if vˆ0 = vL and vˆL = vH , then pˆL < pˆ0.
Moreover, and most importantly, “criss-cross” renegotiation do not occur in equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Generically, in any SP-PE, vˆ0 ≤ vˆL ≤ vˆH .
Roughly spoken, if the buyer expects a lower-value (higher-value) default outcome vk to be
renegotiated upward (downward) to a weakly higher (lower) value, then he cannot rationally
expect a higher-value (lower-value) default outcome vτ > vk (vτ < vk) to be renegotiated
downward (upward) to a value strictly below (above) the renegotiation value he expects for
the low-value (high-value) default outcome vk. Figure 2(a) and (b) illustrate two examples
of expectations that are ruled out by Lemma 4 for the case of a small acceptance set. Note,
however, that Lemma 4 not only allows for “weakly monotonic” renegotiation as in Figure 2(c),
but also for “non-monotonic” materially efficient renegotiation as depicted in Figure 2(d).
For future reference, define
λ˜E,A ≡ 1
QH(E,A)
[
cH − cL
vH − vL − 1
]
, (15)
which is an important threshold for the characterization of the SP-PPEa. Additionally, let
Λ∗(CE,A(p¯)) denote the buyer’s equilibrium expectations regarding the outcome of renegoti-
ation under long-term contract CE,A(p¯).
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(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(a)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(b)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(c)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(0, 0) (vL, cL) (vH , cH)
(d)
Figure 2: Illustration of Lemma 4 for |A| ≤ (n+ 1)/2.
3.4. Sales Contract / Employment Contracts with Small Acceptance Sets
Suppose the buyer accepted a contract with price p¯ and a small acceptance set, |A| < (n+1)/2,
which encompasses the prominent case of a sales contract. Within this class of contracts any
form of the default outcome may occur, (0, 0), (vL, cL) or (vH , cH). Lemmas 2 and 4 leave us
with four sets of expectations to consider, namely ΛLLL, ΛLLH , ΛLHH , and ΛHHH . First, as
depicted in Figure 2(d), suppose the buyer expects renegotiation always to lead to provision of
the materially efficient service, i.e.,
Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLLL0 ), (vL, p¯), (vL, pˆLLLH )} =: ΛLLL (16)
Regarding the trade price, the buyer expects to obtain a discount in comparison to the price
specified in the original contract if vD(θ, C) = vH , whereas he expects to be charged a mark-up
if vD(θ, C) = 0. Formally, pˆLLLH < p¯ < pˆ
LLL
0 . With the seller having all the bargaining power at
the renegotiation stage, the buyer’s price expectations are pinned down by U(vL, pˆLLL0 |ΛLLL) =
U(0, p¯|ΛLLL) and U(vL, pˆLLLH |ΛLLL) = U(vH , p¯| ΛLLL) such that
pˆLLL0 = p¯+
(1 + λ) vL
1 + λ(QL(E,A) +QH(E,A)) (17)
and
pˆLLLH = p¯−
vH − vL
1 + λQH(E,A) . (18)
The prices consistent with materially efficient renegotiations allow for the important obser-
vation that loss aversion creates scope for the seller to exploit the buyer during renegotiations.
First, due to the buyer’s attachment to value vL, the renegotiated mark-up in case of a worthless
default outcome exceeds the buyer’s actual increase in value, pˆLLL0 − p¯ > vL. Likewise, ex-
pecting a price concession in case of a high-value default outcome makes the buyer attached to
the idea of obtaining a discount. This, in turn, leads to the buyer accepting a price concession
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that falls short of the actual reduction on value, p¯ − pˆLLLH < vH − vL. Note that both sorts of
exploitation become more severe the higher the buyer’s degree of loss aversion.
If the buyer expects renegotiations always to result in materially efficient trade, there is no
scope for the seller to profitably deviate from the buyers expectations: any renegotiation offer
different from those expected by the buyer either will be rejected by the buyer or is unprofitable
for the seller to make in the first place. Moreover, expecting that renegotiations always lead
to the implementation of the materially efficient outcome always is a consistent plan for the
buyer. We can now state our first result regarding the subgame beginning with the choice of an
employment contract with a small acceptance set.
Proposition 2. Consider C = CE,A(p¯) with |A| < (n + 1)/2. There always exists a SP-PE
with Λ∗(C) = ΛLLL.
According to Proposition 2, if the buyer expects that renegotiations are always materially
efficient, the materially efficient service is indeed always delivered ex post—independent of the
buyer’s degree of loss aversion. In other words, if the parties expect that renegotiations are likely
to take place, renegotiations will take place fairly often and the materially efficient outcome is
always achieved. As we will show below, however, materially efficient renegotiations are not
always the SP-PPE. The buyer’s expected utility under materially efficient renegotiation is
EU(ΛLLL) = vL − p¯−Q0(E,A)(1 + λ)vL
+QH(E,A) · 1− λ(1−QH(E,A))
1 + λQH(E,A) · (vH − vL) (19)
Next, the buyer might expect the worthless default outcome to be renegotiated to the provision
of the materially efficient service at a positive mark-up and renegotiations not to occur if the
default outcome is of high value to him. Let these expectations be denoted by
Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLLH0 ), (vL, p¯), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛLLH , (20)
where p¯ < pˆLLH0 . The buyer’s price expectations are pinned down by U(vL, pˆ
LLL
0 |ΛLLH)
= U(0, p¯|ΛLLH), which can be solved for
pˆLLH0 = p¯+
1 + λ
1 + λQH(E,A) vL. (21)
Again, the mark-up in prices is higher than the actual increase in value, pˆLLH0 − p¯ ≥ vL, i.e., the
buyer is exploited because of his attachment with regard to the value dimension. If vD(θ, C) =
vH , however, the seller might possibly benefit from deviating from the buyer’s expectations
by offering provision of the materially efficient service at a discount price. This particular
deviation may be profitable because it does not impose any losses in the money dimension on
the buyer and leads to only a moderate loss in the value dimension such that the concession
in the trade price necessary to make the buyer agree to renegotiation is not overly high . With
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pR = p¯− (1 +λQH(E,A))(vH −vL) being the maximum price at which the buyer is willing to
accept renegotiation, i.e. U(vL, pR|ΛLLH) = U(vH , p¯|ΛLLH), the seller refrains from offering
renegotiation to the efficient service if pR − cL ≤ p¯− cH . This, in turn, holds if and only if the
buyer is fairly loss averse, i.e., λ ≥ λ˜E,A defined by (15). As it turns out, no other deviation
is profitable for the seller such that expectations ΛLLH are part of a SP-PE if λ ≥ λ˜E,A. The
buyer’s expected utility under expectations ΛLLH is
EU(ΛLLH) = vL − p¯−Q0(E,A)(1 + λ)vL
+QH(E,A) · [1− λ(1−QH(E,A))] · (vH − vL). (22)
Regarding the two sets of expectations considered so far, what is the buyer’s preferred plan
consistent with subsequent equilibrium play? Comparison of (19) and (22) reveals that the buyer
prefers less variation in prices, as embodied by expectations ΛLLH , over stability in the value
dimension at a low level, as embodied by expectations ΛLLL, whenever the former expectations
are consistent with subsequent rational behavior, i.e., whenever λ ≥ λ˜E,A. Inspection of the
prices consistent with these courses of renegotiation, cf. (18), (17) and (21), provides some
intuition. For both ΛLLL and ΛLLH the buyer is exploited in case of a worthless default outcome
because of his attachment to the idea of obtaining some valuable service. While this sort of
exploitation is even stronger under ΛLLH , the buyer is exploited under ΛLLL also in the case
of a high-value default outcome because of his attachment to the idea of obtaining a price
concession. Since the degree of exploitation increases in the buyer’s degree of loss aversion,
for a highly loss-averse buyer the expectation of being exploited on two accounts under ΛLLL
(together with the fact that he will sometimes obtain the highest possible value under ΛLLH)
makes expecting materially efficient renegotiations very unattractive.
Finally, there are two further sets of expectations in accordance with Lemmas 2 and 4: on the
one hand, the buyer might expect always the high-value/high-cost outcome to be implemented,
i.e., Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vH , pˆHHH0 ), (vH , pˆHHHL ), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛHHH ; on the other hand, the buyer
might expect the worthless default to be renegotiated to the materially efficient outcome and
the materially efficient outcome to be renegotiated to he high-value/high-cost outcome, i.e.,
Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLHH0 ), (vH , pˆLHHL ), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛLHH . These expectations, however, are
never part of the buyer’s PPE. As we show in the Appendix A, expectations ΛLHH and ΛHHH ,
which involve a high degree of price variation and relatively high mark-up prices for both the
worthless and the materially efficient outcome, are less favorable from the buyer’s perspective
than expectations ΛLLL or ΛLLH , which provide stability of value in combination with either
moderate mark-ups or relatively few variations in prices.
Proposition 3. Consider C = CE,A(p¯) with |A| < (n+1)/2. The SP-PPE consists of Λ∗(C) =
ΛLLL for λ ≤ λ˜E,A and Λ∗(C) = ΛLLH for λ > λ˜E,A.
Proposition 3 has some interesting implications regarding the likelihood of ex post ineffi-
ciency to occur, which the following corollary summarizes for the prominent case of a sales
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contract.
Corollary 2. Under a sales contract, |A| = 1, inefficient renegotiations become more likely (in
the sense of set inclusion) as (i) λ increases, or (ii) n increases.
According to part (i), with a more loss-averse buyer it is less likely that the parties always
agree upon implementing the materially efficient outcome ex post. The reason is that for a more
loss-averse buyer it is more likely that not renegotiating in case of a high-value default outcome
is a consistent behavior. Once the buyer gets attached to the idea of obtaining a high-value
service at least in some states, it becomes too costly for the seller to compensate him in order
to implement the materially efficient outcome. Regarding part (ii), note that for a sales contract
we have QH(E,A) = (n− 1)/2n. Thus, the environment becomes more certain as n increases
in the sense that it becomes less likely that the materially efficient outcome is the default. Since
λ˜E,A is decreasing in n, materially efficient trade is more likely to occur if the environment
is rather uncertain, i.e., if n is small. Intuitively, as is shown by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), a
loss-averse decision maker becomes less risk averse if the background risk increases, which is
why here materially efficient trade is more likely to occur in equilibrium if n is small.
3.5. Employment Contracts with Large Acceptance Sets
Suppose the buyer accepted an employment contract with a large acceptance set, |A| > (n +
1)/2, which encompasses the case of an employment relationship with maximum discretion
(A = X ). With every possible outcome (v, c) ∈ {(0, 0), (vL, cL), (vH , cH)} being a feasible
choice in the acceptance set, there is no uncertainty about the default outcome under either type
of employment contract.
Buyer employment contract.—For E = B, we have (vD(θ, CB,A(p¯)), cD(θ, CB,A(p¯))) =
(vH , cH) for all θ ∈ Θ, i.e., whenever renegotiations do not take place, the buyer chooses
a materially inefficient high-value/high-cost service. The buyer’s expectations regarding the
outcome of renegotiation comprise a single value-price pair, Λ(CB,A(p¯)) = {(vˆH , pˆH)}.
First, suppose the buyer expects materially efficient renegotiation to occur and denote these
expectations by
Λ(CB,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLH)} =: ΛLB. (23)
Since renegotiation involves a decrease in value, the buyer has to expect to be offered a discount
price pˆLH < p¯. The only price compatible with equilibrium—equating the buyer’s utility from
accepting the seller’s renegotiation offer, U(vL, pˆLH |ΛLB) = vL−pˆLH , and his utility from rejecting
renegotiation, U(vH , p¯|ΛLB) = vH − p¯− λ(p¯− pˆLH)—is
pˆLH = p¯−
vH − vL
1 + λ
. (24)
With the associated profits for the seller amounting to pˆLH − cL, there is no profitable deviation:
first, not offering renegotiation at all results in strictly lower profits p¯−cH ; second, according to
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Corollary 1, offering renegotiations to a worthless service is not profitable for the seller. Thus,
as for employment contracts with small acceptance sets, there always is a SP-PE with materially
efficient renegotiation. The buyer’s expected utility in this equilibrium amounts to
EU(ΛLB) = vL − p¯+
vH − vL
1 + λ
. (25)
On the other hand, the buyer might expect renegotiation not to occur and thus to obtain a
high-value service at price p¯, i.e.,
Λ(CB,A(p¯)) = {(vH , p¯)} =: ΛHB . (26)
Despite these expectations, at the renegotiation stage the seller might offer to deliver the efficient
service at a discount price. The buyer accepts this offer for any price below pR = p¯ − (1 +
λ)(vH−vL), at which he is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the seller’s renegotiation
offer, i.e., U(vL, pR|ΛHB ) = vL − pR − λ(vH − vL) equals U(vH , p¯|ΛHB ) = vH − p¯. The seller
has no incentive to deviate from the buyer’s expectation if pR − cL ≤ p¯ − cH or, equivalently,
if the buyer’s loss aversion is rather strong, i.e., λ ≥ λ˜E,A. Since renegotiation to the delivery
of a worthless service never is profitable for the seller (cf. Corrolary 1), λ ≥ λ˜E,A not only is
necessary but also sufficient for existence of a SP-PE in which renegotiations never take place.
The buyer’s expected utility in this equilibrium is
EU(ΛHB ) = vH − p¯. (27)
Finally, by Lemma 2, the buyer expecting renegotiation to result in the delivery of a worthless
service, vˆH = 0, is incompatible with equilibrium.
Comparison of (25) and (27) reveals that for λ > 0 the buyer strictly prefers the materially
inefficient no-renegotiation outcome. Expecting no renegotiation to occur is consistent with
equilibrium, however, only if the buyer’s attachment to high value, captured by his degree of
loss aversion λ, is sufficiently strong.
Proposition 4. Consider C = CB,A(p¯) with |A| > (n+ 1)/2.
(i) There always exists a SP-PE with Λ∗(C) = ΛLB.
(ii) The SP-PPE consists of Λ∗(C) = ΛLB if λ < λ˜B,A and Λ
∗(C) = ΛHB if λ ≥ λ˜B,A.
According to Proposition 4, while always constituting a SP-PE, materially efficient renego-
tiations correspond to the SP-PPE only for mild degrees of loss aversion. The reason is that if
the buyer is loss averse and expects materially efficient renegotiations to occur, the necessary
reduction in price to make him willing to accept materially efficient renegotiations is lower than
the reduction in value vH −vL. This is the case because the buyer suffers more from not obtain-
ing the discount price than he gains from obtaining the high-value service. In consequence, the
buyer is better off by not expecting to renegotiate the contract with the seller in the first place.
This is a credible plan, however, only if the buyer is sufficiently loss averse.
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Note that a buyer employment contract with large acceptance set achieves the maximum
feasible overall surplus if λ < 1−(cH−cL)/(vH−vL) = λ˜B,A: on the one hand, there is always
materially efficient trade ex post, and, on the other hand, any losses are eliminated because the
buyer knows for sure that he will pay pˆLH and will obtain value vL. Thus, if the buyer is only
mildly loss averse, a buyer employment contract with large acceptance set represents an optimal
contract. Finally, note that (in contrast to small acceptance sets) the likelihood of materially
efficient renegotiations to occur is independent of the complexity of the environment n.
Seller employment contract.— For E = S, we have (vD(θ, CS,A(p¯)), cD(θ, CS,A(p¯))) =
(0, 0) for all θ ∈ Θ, i.e., the seller always opts for the provision of a no cost (worthless) service.
Again, the buyer’s expectations regarding the outcome of renegotiation comprise a single value-
price pair, Λ(CS,A(p¯)) = {vˆ0, pˆ0}.
Suppose the buyer expects materially efficient renegotiations to occur,
ΛL(CS,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆL0 )} =: ΛLS . (28)
Since renegotiation involve an increase in the seller’s cost, the buyer has to expect to be de-
manded a mark-up pˆL0 − p¯ > 0. The highest price the seller can charge so that the buyer accepts
her offer—given that this price is also the buyer’s reference point—is
pˆL0 = p¯+ (1 + λ)vL. (29)
With the seller’s profits amounting to pˆL0 − cL, there is no profitable deviation: first, not offering
renegotiation at all results in strictly lower profits equal to p¯; second, the highest price at which
the buyer would be willing to accept a high-value/high-cost service equals pR = pˆL0 + (vH −
vL)/(1 + λ), which results in strictly lower profits pR − cH than offering to deliver the efficient
service at price pˆL0 . Thus, materially efficient renegotiation always constitutes a SP-PE that
results in expected utility
EU(ΛLS) = −λvL − p¯. (30)
Next, note that the buyer expecting renegotiation not to be offered—i.e., to obtain zero value
at price p¯, cannot be an equilibrium by Lemma 2.
Finally, the buyer might expect the seller to offer renegotiation to the materially inefficient
high-value/high-cost service,
ΛH(CS,A(p¯)) = {(vH , pˆH0 )} =: ΛHS . (31)
The only price pˆH0 > p¯ compatible with such an equilibrium is
pˆH0 = p¯+ (1 + λ)vH . (32)
Whenever these expectations are consistent with sequential rationality, which is the case for λ
sufficiently large, there exists a SP-PE of this type. The buyer’s expected utility in this equilib-
rium is
EU(ΛHS ) = −λvH − p¯. (33)
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Regarding the buyer’s PPE, comparison of (30) and (33) reveals that the buyer strictly prefers
materially efficient renegotiation.
Proposition 5. Consider C = CS,A(p¯) with |A| > (n+1)/2. There always exists a SP-PE with
Λ∗(C) = ΛLS . Moreover, this is also the SP-PPE for all λ ≥ 0.
In our setup, a seller employment contract with a large acceptance set always is an optimal
contract. It always leads to the implementation of the materially efficient service ex post. Fur-
thermore, there is no uncertainty for the buyer, neither regarding the ultimate price he has to
pay, nor regarding his valuation of the delivered service. Thus, the buyer does not incur a loss
on the equilibrium path.
The finding that under a seller employment contract with complete acceptance set materi-
ally efficient renegotiation always takes place at first glance seems in contrast to Herweg and
Schmidt (2013). The strong finding in favor of a seller employment contract, however, is due
to Assumption 1. If Assumption 1 does not hold, no renegotiation—i.e., trading the worthless
service in each state at price p¯, may constitute a SP-PE. Suppose the buyer expects renegotiation
not to occur, i.e.,
Λ(CS,A(p¯)) = {(0, p¯)} =: Λ0S. (34)
The buyer’s expected utility in this case is
EU(Λ0S) = −p¯, (35)
which is higher than EU(ΛLS) and EU(Λ
H
S ). Thus, whenever Λ
0
S constitutes a credible plan, it
constitutes the SP-PPE. For Λ0S to be a credible plan, there must not be the possibility for the
seller to offer renegotiation to a service with strictly positive value v ∈ {vL, vH}. The buyer
rejects any such offer at price pR if
v − pR − λ(pR − p¯) ≤ −p¯. (36)
If the above inequality holds for the materially efficient service under the lowest possible rene-
gotiation price the seller finds profitable to offer in this case, i.e., v = vL and pR = p¯+ cL, then
it holds for the high-value/ high-cost service, accordingly. Thus, no renegotiation is a credible
plan if and only if vL/(1 + λ) ≤ cL.
Observation 2. Suppose vL ≤ 2cL. Consider C = CS,A(p¯) with |A| > (n+ 1)/2.
(i) There always exists a SP-PE with Λ∗(C) = ΛLS .
(ii) The SP-PPE consists of Λ∗(C) = ΛLS if λ < (vL − cL)/cL and Λ∗(C) = Λ0S if λ ≥
(vL − cL)/cL.
If Assumption 1 is relaxed, a similar structure can be found for the seller employment contract
with a large acceptance set as for the corresponding buyer employment contract. The loss-averse
buyer is exploited by the seller when renegotiation occurs. Thus, the buyer is better off by not
expecting to renegotiate the contract with the seller, which is a credible plan if the buyer is
sufficiently loss averse.
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3.6. Employment Contracts with Medium Acceptance Sets
Buyer employment contract.—For E = B at least one service in the acceptance set yields a
value of at least vL. With the buyer always opting for the maximum value in case that renegoti-
ation does not occur, the default outcome is (vL, cL) in some states and (vH , cH) in others.
With Lemmas 2 and 4 ruling out that a worthless outcome prevails as well as criss-cross
renegotiations, we are left with three sets of expectations as potential equilibrium candidates.
First, the buyer might expect renegotiation always to result in delivery of the materially effi-
cient service, i.e., Λ(CB,A(p¯)) = {(vL, p¯), (vL, pˆLLH )} =: ΛLLB . As with a large acceptance set,
materially efficient renegotiation always constitutes a SP-PE. The second set of expectations
potentially consistent with equilibrium is that renegotiation never occur, i.e., Λ(CB,A(p¯)) =
{(vL, p¯), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛLHB . Finally, the buyer might expect renegotiation always to result
in the delivery of a materially inefficient high-value/high-cost service, i.e., Λ(CB,A(p¯)) =
{(vH , pˆHHL ), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛHHB .
Comparison of the buyer’s expected utility across these sets of expectations reveals that the
buyer prefers renegotiation not to occur (ΛLHB ) whenever expecting renegotiation not to occur
constitutes a SP-PE. The buyer expecting renegotiation not to occur is consistent with SP-PE
only for a rather high degree of loss aversion, i.e., for λ ≥ λ˜B,A. Thus, a strongly loss-averse
buyer prefers certainty in the price dimension over certainty in the value dimension.18 For
λ < λ˜B,A, on the other hand, materially efficient renegotiations (ΛLLB ) support the SP-PPE.
Thus, while inefficient renegotiations (ΛHHB ) may be consistent with SP-PE for a mildly loss-
averse buyer, he prefers low-value stability with occasional price concessions over high-value
stability with occasional price mark-ups.
Seller employment contract.—With the seller always opting for the minimum cost in case
that renegotiation does not occur, the default outcome in some states is (0, 0) and in other states
it is (vL, cL).
Suppose the buyer expects renegotiation to result in the delivery of the materially efficient ser-
vice, i.e., Λ(CS,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLL0 ), (vL, p¯)} =: ΛLLS . The buyer expecting materially efficient
renegotiation leaves no room for any profitable deviation of the seller, i.e., ΛLLS is a SP-PE.
In accordance with Lemmas 2 and 4, the buyer might hold two further sets of expectations:
Λ(CS,A(p¯)) = {(vH , pˆHH0 ), (vH , pˆHHL )} =: ΛHHS or Λ(CS,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLH0 ), (vH , pˆLHL )} =:
ΛLHS . While these expectations are consistent with sequential rationality if the buyer is suf-
ficiently loss averse, his expected utility under these expectations is strictly lower than under
materially efficient renegotiation because of the high mark-up prices associated with renegotia-
tions to the high-value/high-cost outcome.
Proposition 6. Consider C = CE,A(p¯) with |A| = (n+ 1)/2.
18A somewhat similar finding—that an expectation-based loss-averse decision maker with a universal gain-loss
function dislikes fluctuations in prices more than he dislikes fluctuations in values—is obtained by Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi (2008), and in fact it is a major driver of their “focal pricing” result.
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(i) For E = B the SP-PPE consists of Λ∗(C) = ΛLLB if λ ≤ λ˜B,A and Λ∗(C) = ΛLHB if
λ > λ˜B,A. Moreover, there always exists a SP-PE with Λ∗(C) = ΛLLB .
(ii) For E = S the SP-PPE consists of Λ∗(C) = ΛLLS for all λ.
With a medium acceptance set a seller employment contract ensures that the materially effi-
cient good is always traded ex post. If the buyer is only mildly loss averse, materially efficient
trade takes also always place under a buyer employment contract with medium acceptance set.
These contracts are nevertheless not optimal because they lead to variations in prices caused by
the uncertain default outcome. Due to the uncertainty in the price dimension the buyer ex ante
expects to incur losses, which reduces the ex ante expected surplus from contracting below the
maximal achievable surplus.
3.7. The Optimal Long-Term Contract
At date 0, both sellers submit a long-term contract offer to the buyer. With sellers competing
for the buyer’s favor, spot contracting, which is rather unfavorable from the buyer’s perspective,
will not occur in equilibrium. The Bertrand nature of seller competition at date 0 makes sellers
offer contracts that maximize the buyer’s expected utility subject to the constraint that expected
profits do not fall short of the fleeting outside option. The most attractive long-term contract a
seller can offer therefore pursues ex post material efficiency and minimizes the buyer’s expected
losses associated with renegotiation. This can be achieved only by employment contracts with
a sufficiently large acceptance set. For |A| > (n+ 1)/2, the trade price which equates a seller’s
profits with the profits from the outside option is
p¯(B,A) = pi + cL + vH − vL
1 + λ
(37)
for the buyer employment contract and
p¯(S,A) = pi + cL − (1 + λ)vL (38)
for the seller employment contract.
Proposition 7. In a SP-PPE, seller i = 1, 2 offers a contract C = CEi,Ai(p¯(Ei,Ai)) with
|A| > (n+ 1)/2 and (i) Ei ∈ {S,B} if λ < λ˜B,A, (ii) Ei = S if λ ≥ λ˜B,A.
Under the standard approach of the incomplete contracting literature, i.e., with a loss-neutral
buyer, each form of long-term contract is optimal irrespective of the size of the acceptance set
or which party is designated to choose (cf. Observation 1). In particular, also a sales contract
is optimal. According to Proposition 7, with a loss-averse buyer, in contrast, only employment
contracts with sufficiently large acceptance sets prevail in equilibrium—e.g., employment re-
lationships with a maximum degree of discretion in form of a complete acceptance set. Thus,
our theory provides a rationale for the employment relationship if renegotiations are feasible
even in the absence of non-contractible investments. Keep in mind that the strict optimality of
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a seller-employment contract with a large acceptance set is due to Assumption 1. If we relax
Assumption 1, the seller employment contract is not necessarily optimal for high degrees of loss
aversion. In a more general model, for high degrees of buyer loss aversion, we cannot expect
that the parties can achieve both: material efficiency and no losses.
How can the optimality of a seller employment contract with large acceptance set be inter-
preted in terms of a practical example? Suppose the buyer owns a car which needs to be repaired
and the seller operates a car repair shop. Ex ante, it is uncertain to what extent each feasible
treatment increases the value of the car and how costly it is. The seller employment contract
can be interpreted as a situation where the customer writes a contract with the car repair shop,
so that the car repair shop performs only the treatments necessary that the car is roadworthy
again at some prespecified price p¯. Let the gains from trade if the car is fixed so that it is just
roadworthy be normalized to zero. Before the customer picks his car up, however, the shop calls
and tells him that it would be reasonable—even though not necessary in a strict sense—to do
this and that additional repair, which increases the value of the car but would also be somewhat
more costly. The car repair shop proposes the materially efficient service at price pˆ > p¯ which
is accepted by the customer. In this example, as in many casual observations, the ultimate bill
of the car repair shop is higher than the initially specified price. This happens even though the
customer is loss averse and therefore suffers from unexpected price increases. The reason for
this nevertheless to happen is that the customer rationally anticipates that the initial contract
will be renegotiated and that he will ultimately pay a higher price than originally specified.
The comparison of employment contracts and sales contracts goes back to Simon (1951).
While both forms of contractual arrangement fix a trade price, the former leaves a lot of discre-
tion to the “employer” to tell the “employee” ex post which specification of the service will be
traded, whereas the latter also specifies the nature of the service ex ante. According to Simon,
the advantage of the first is its flexibility, which allows for the delivered service to be efficiently
adjusted to the state of the world. On the other hand, this flexibility, which is absent under a
sales contract, at the same time makes the employment contract prone to abuse by the employer,
who will be tempted to choose his/her most preferred service instead of the efficient service.
This trade-off in the choice of the optimal long-term contract, however, disappears if Coasian
bargaining is feasible ex post—i.e., if the parties can renegotiate the initial contract (Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005). In our setup, the advantage of an employment contract is indeed rooted
in its flexibility. The channel through which this flexibility benefits the trading relationship
goes beyond ensuring materially efficient trade—remember that if the buyer is only mildly loss
averse, the materially efficient outcome is implemented under a sales contract as well. The
advantage of the employment contract rather is that it makes the default outcome under renego-
tiations deterministic and thereby achieves to eliminate any losses in value or prices otherwise
incurred by the buyer. Nevertheless, if one picks the “wrong” employment contract, then also
abuse as discussed by Simon appears in our setting. Under a buyer employment contract, if the
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buyer is highly loss averse, he picks an inefficient high-value/high-cost service and is unwilling
to renegotiate away from this outcome. In this case, the seller always has to provide one of the
very costly services and therefore is—in a sense—abused by the buyer.
4. NON-CONTRACTIBLE INVESTMENTS AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
In this section, we augment our model by allowing the buyer to make a non-contractible in-
vestment at date 1 that increases his valuation at date 5 in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1988).
Investment I ∈ {0, 1} is associated with cost ψI for the buyer, where ψ > 0. The investment
increases the buyer’s valuation from any valuable service but not from the provision of a worth-
less service. Moreover, the investment is particularly effective if the materially efficient service
is traded ex post. Formally, the buyer’s valuation now depends on his investment, vk(I) with
k ∈ {0, L,H}, and we have
vL(1)− vL(0) > vH(1)− vH(0) > 0 = v0(1) = v0(0). (39)
Furthermore, next to Assumption 1 being satisfied for all I , we impose the following assump-
tion, which ensures that a loss-neutral buyer’s investment incentives are higher under a buyer
employment contract with large acceptance set than under a sales contract.
Assumption 3.
vL(1)− vL(0)
vH(1)− vH(0) <
n+ 1
2
. (40)
The sellers’ costs are independent of the buyer’s investment decision. In addition, even
though non-contractible, the buyer’s investment choice is observed by all sellers at the begin-
ning of date 2.
Loss-Neutral Buyer and First-Best Investments.—The joint surplus is maximized for I = 1
if investing leads to an increase in joint surplus from materially efficient trade that exceeds the
buyer’s investment cost, i.e., if
ψ ≤ vL(1)− vL(0) =: ψFB. (41)
Due to the frictions caused by incomplete contracting, however, the buyer’s investment incen-
tives are inefficiently too low. In the following, we investigate which type of incomplete contract
maximizes the buyer’s investment incentives.19
Note that with ex post trade being always efficient for λ = 0, the optimal long-term contract
maximizes the investment incentives for the buyer. Moreover, any type of seller employment
contract leads to lower investment incentives than the corresponding buyer employment contract
with the same size of the acceptance set. In particular, under a seller employment contract with
19We say that a contract maximizes the buyer’s investment incentives if it maximizes the range of investment costs
ψ for which the buyer chooses I = 1.
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large acceptance set (just as under a spot contract) the buyer has no incentives to invest because
the seller has all the bargaining power ex post.
Under a buyer employment contract with large acceptance set the buyer invests if ψ ≤ ψB,L,
where
ψB,L := vH(1)− vH(0). (42)
Under a buyer employment contract with small (or medium) acceptance set, the buyer invests if
ψ ≤ ψB,S(s), where
ψB,S(s) := QL(B,A)[vL(1)− vL(0)] +QH(B,A)[vH(1)− vH(0)] (43)
and s = n+1
2
− |A| ∈ {0, . . . , (n − 1)/2} is inversely related to the size of the acceptance set
according to (12) and (13). Note that s = 0 corresponds to a buyer employment contract with
medium acceptance set. With QH being decreasing and QL being independent of s it follows
immediately that s = 0 maximizes the investment incentives. In addition, ψB,S(0) > ψB,L >
ψB,S(n−12 ).
Observation 3. Suppose the buyer is not loss averse. Then, the range of investment costs for
which the buyer undertakes the investment is maximized under a buyer employment contract
with medium acceptance set.
4.1. Loss Aversion and the Hold-Up Problem
Next, we investigate how buyer loss aversion affects the hold-up problem and which contract
creates the highest incentives to invest. While we do not solve for the overall optimal long-term
contract explicitly, we discuss the trade-offs between ex post material efficiency, induced losses,
and ex ante investments that the choice of the optimal long-term contract typically involves.
Any type of seller employment contract is dominated by a buyer employment contract with
large acceptance set.20 Moreover, without investment, if the buyer’s degree of loss aversion
is moderate, a buyer employment contract with large acceptance set eliminates any losses and
thus is an optimal contract. Therefore, we first analyze the investment incentives created by this
type of contract in detail. Thereafter, we address buyer employment contracts with small and
medium acceptance sets.
Buyer employment contract with large acceptance set.—When deciding at date 1 whether to
invest or not, the buyer takes into account how his investment decision affects his reference
point such that he never feels a loss in the “investment cost” dimension. For a given level of
investment, the SP-PPE is materially efficient renegotiations if
λ <
cH − cL
vH(I)− vL(I) − 1 =: λ˜B,L(I), (44)
20A buyer employment contract with large acceptance set not only leads to higher investment incentives (as in
the case of a loss-neutral buyer) but also induces (weakly) lower losses than any type of seller employment
contract.
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and no renegotiation otherwise. The λ-threshold depends on the buyer’s investment decision
and, therefore, is now endogenous. By the assumption implied by (39), we have λ˜B,L(1) >
λ˜B,L(0), i.e., investment by the buyer reduces the range for which no renegotiation to take
place constitutes a SP-PE. Hence, three cases have to be considered: (i) For mild degrees of
loss aversion, efficient renegotiation takes always place independent of the buyer’s investment
decision. (ii) For intermediate degrees of loss aversion, materially efficient renegotiation takes
place ex post only if the buyer undertakes the investment ex ante. (iii) For high degrees of loss
aversion renegotiation does not take place independent of the investment choice.
First, for λ < λ˜B,L(0), by (25) the buyer undertakes the investment if
ψ ≤ ψB,L + λ
1 + λ
{
[vL(1)− vL(0)]− [vH(1)− vH(0)]
}
=: ψB,L(λ). (45)
Note that buyer loss aversion here enhances the investment incentives and thus reduces the
hold-up problem, i.e., ∂ψB,L/∂λ > 0. At first glance, this might be surprising because the
buyer is exploited by the seller in the SP-PE with efficient renegotiations. In order to understand
this, note that by (39), the price reduction the seller offers to the buyer in order to implement
the materially efficient service is decreasing in the investment—cf.(24). This reduction in the
discount, however, is less pronounced for a loss-averse buyer who already receives a smaller
discount without investment. This explains why investment incentives are increasing in the
degree of loss aversion. Yet, the first-best investment level is never reached since the seller has
all the bargaining power ex post.
Second, in the intermediate case, λ˜B,L(0) ≤ λ < λ˜B,L(1), renegotiation takes place if the
buyer undertakes the investment but otherwise a high-value service is always traded. By (25)
and (27) the buyer prefers to invest if
ψ ≤ ψB,L − λ
1 + λ
[vH(1)− vL(1)]. (46)
Note that in this intermediate case investment incentives are lowest and the buyer’s willingness
to invest is decreasing in his degree of loss aversion.
Finally, for λ ≥ λ˜B,L(1) a high-value services is always traded irrespective of whether the
buyer undertakes the investment. Hence, by (27), the buyer invests if ψ ≤ ψB,L.
The buyer’s optimal investment decision as function of his degree of loss aversion depending
on the investment costs is depicted in Figure 3. The intuition behind the downward discontinu-
ity at λ˜B,L(0) is as follows: The buyer always prefers no renegotiations to occur over materially
efficient renegotiations because in the latter case the seller exploits the buyer’s loss aversion ex
post. Expecting no renegotiations to take place, however, is not always a credible plan—in par-
ticular, if the buyer invests, he is always willing to renegotiate to the materially efficient service
because the investment increases the buyer’s value from materially efficient trade more than it
increases his value from a high-value service. In other words, not undertaking the investment is
a commitment for the buyer not to renegotiate the contract ex post, which protects him from ex
post opportunism by the seller.
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λ˜B,L(0) λ˜B,L(1)
ψ
λ
Figure 3: Critical Investment cost for a large acceptance set
Maximum investment incentives.—We now investigate the optimal size of the acceptance set
of the buyer employment contract in order to achieve the highest investment incentives. We
restrict attention to λ < λ˜B,L(0), so that materially efficient renegotiation always takes place
and thus the case of a loss-neutral buyer represents a clear benchmark.
Suppose the buyer signed a buyer employment contract with a small acceptance set. From
(19) it is readily established that in this case the buyer undertakes the investment only if ψ ≤
ψB,S(s, λ), where
ψB,S(s, λ) := [vL(1)− vL(0)][1−Q0(B,A)(1 + λ)]
−QH(B,A)1− λ[1−QH(B,A)]
1 + λQH(B,A)
{
[vL(1)− vL(0)]− [vH(1)− vH(0)]
}
. (47)
With QH = (n − 1 − s)/n, QL = 1/n, and Q0 = s/n for s ∈ {0, . . . , (n − 1)/2}, s = 0
corresponds to a medium acceptance set and s = (n − 1)/2 to a sales contract. As we show
in the Appendix A, ψB,S(s, ·) is maximized at s = 0. Decreasing s—and thereby increasing
the acceptance set—reduces the probability of the worthless outcome being the default and
therefore enhances the buyer’s willingness to invest. Increasing the acceptance set beyond a
medium acceptance set, however, reduces investment incentives, i.e., ψB,S(s, λ)|s=0 > ψB,L(λ).
This is because the materially efficient outcome as default leads to higher investment incentives
than the high-value outcome as default. Thus, the buyer’s willingness to invest is maximized
for a buyer employment contract with a medium acceptance set.
Whether loss aversion increases or decreases the buyer’s investment incentives crucially de-
pends on the size of the acceptance set. For the extreme cases of buyer employment contract
with a medium acceptance set and a sales contract, tedious but straightforward calculations
show that
∂ψB,S
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
s=0
> 0 and
∂ψB,S
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
s=n−1
2
< 0.
As suggested by this observation, buyer loss aversion indeed reduces the hold-up problem by
enhancing investment incentives only if the buyer employment contract specifies a sufficiently
large acceptance set.
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Proposition 8. Suppose λ < λ˜B,L(0). Then, the range of investment costs for which the buyer
undertakes the investment is maximized under a buyer employment contract with medium ac-
ceptance set. Furthermore, there exists K ∈ (0, n+1
2
) such that the range of investment costs
for which the buyer invests increases in his degree of loss aversion if and only if |A| ≥ K.
The finding that a buyer employment contract with medium acceptance set maximizes the
buyer’s willingness to invest does not imply that this is the optimal contract that is offered in
the SP-PPE. The reason is that a buyer employment contract with medium acceptance set leads
to expected losses for the buyer because the default is uncertain. Therefore, as long as a buyer
employment contract with large acceptance set makes the buyer undertake the investment, this
is the optimal contract because its unique default outcome eliminates any losses. For high
investment costs, so that the buyer undertakes the investment only for a buyer employment
contract with medium acceptance set but not for one with a large acceptance set, there is a trade-
off between enhancing investments and minimizing losses. Depending on how the efficiency
gain of investments compares to the induced losses from an uncertain default outcome, both a
buyer employment contract with medium as well as with a large acceptance set can be optimal—
in the sense of maximizing the overall surplus—and thus be part of the SP-PPE.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze a simple trading relationship between a loss-averse buyer and a profit-
maximizing seller. The gains from trading a particular service depend on the state of nature,
which is unknown to the parties at the point in time when writing a long-term contract. Fol-
lowing the literature on incomplete contracts, the parties are restricted to write contracts that do
not condition on the state of nature. Moreover, whether trade has taken place and whose fault it
was if not can be verified by a court.
We show that the buyer’s expectations regarding the ex post implemented service are cru-
cial for the outcome of renegotiation. In particular, independent of the type of the concluded
contract, if the buyer expects that renegotiation takes place when needed to implement the ma-
terially efficient service, it is indeed an equilibrium that materially efficient renegotiation takes
always place. Materially efficient renegotiation is, however, not always in the buyer’s interest
ex ante. When expecting that materially efficient renegotiation takes always place, the buyer is,
for instance, willing to renegotiate away from a service which leads to a higher value at a rel-
atively moderate price reduction. In consequence, the seller may be able to exploit the buyer’s
loss aversion at the renegotiation stage. Since this is anticipated by the buyer, if the buyer is
severely loss averse, his preferred and also credible plan is not always to renegotiate to the ma-
terially efficient service. In these cases, loss aversion leads to material inefficiencies ex post.
Ex ante, as we argue, the parties write a long-term contract that maximizes the expected utility
of both parties, i.e., the optimal long-term contract achieves a high material efficiency without
imposing severe expected losses on the buyer. In this regard, the optimal long-term contract is
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an employment contract with a large acceptance set. The advantage of such a contract is its un-
ambiguous default outcome, which eliminates any variations in valuations and prices, thereby
minimizing expected losses.
In an extension, we allow the buyer to make a relationship-specific investment. The invest-
ment made by the buyer increases the gains from trade—in particular, from materially efficient
trade. With the investment cost being sunk at the renegotiation stage, the seller has an incentive
to hold up the buyer. We characterize situations in which buyer loss aversion can reduce the
hold-up problem and thereby enhances investment incentives.
Admittedly, regarding several aspects, our model is fairly stylized. Solving this model, how-
ever, requires an involved case-by-case analysis. Many of the simplifying assumptions are
imposed in order to reduce the number of case distinctions and are not crucial for our main
findings.
First, we presume that only the buyer is loss averse. Assuming that the seller is also expectation-
based loss averse does not change the main insights. The interesting effects in our model arise
because the seller, who has all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage, may exploit the
buyer’s loss aversion. If the seller is also loss-averse, an employment contract with large accep-
tance set is still optimal, even if the buyer is allowed to freely choose the service ex post. When
the seller expects materially efficient renegotiation, she incurs a loss when delivering a high-
cost service. The loss-averse buyer is willing to renegotiate away from a high-value service to
the materially efficient service for a reduction in the price that is lower than the reduction in his
valuation if he expected materially efficient trade. Thus, it is still an equilibrium that materially
efficient trade takes always place. Moreover, this is also the preferred personal equilibrium as
long as the buyer’s degree of loss aversion is not too severe. In addition, under a seller employ-
ment contract, in the SP-PPE materially efficient trade takes always place—independent of the
buyer’s and the seller’s degree of loss aversion.
A second simplifying assumption is that sellers can always make take-it-or-leave-it offers to
the buyer. For initial contracting the distribution of bargaining power does not play a crucial role
because the parties will always agree to write a contract that maximizes the joint surplus of both
parties including potential losses. Therefore, the type of the concluded contract is independent
of the ex ante bargaining power, only the initially specified price—which divides the expected
surplus between the two parties—depends on it. The distribution of the bargaining power ex
post, however, has an impact on the optimal long-term contract. As we have outlined above, the
interesting effects arise because the loss-averse party can be exploited at the renegotiation stage
which requires that the loss-averse party does not have too much bargaining power. In the paper
we consider the extreme where the buyer is loss averse and the seller has all the bargaining
power. If the buyer remains the only loss-averse party but has all the bargaining power at the
renegotiation stage, materially efficient renegotiations will always take place. If, on the other
hand, the seller is loss averse and the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, materially effi-
cient trade does not always take place in the SP-PPE under a seller employment contract with
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large acceptance set. With the buyer exploiting that the seller expects the contract to be renego-
tiated, it can be optimal and credible for the seller to expect that renegotiation does not always
take place. Moreover, from a technical point of view, considering less extreme distributions of
the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage—say, each party can make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer with some probability—would increase the number of cases tremendously. In this case,
expectations regarding the outcome of renegotiation would depend not only on the default out-
come but also on which party is allowed to make the renegotiation offer.
Additionally, we consider a model with only three types of ex post outcomes. In particular,
gains from materially efficient trade are independent of the state of nature. Due to this assump-
tion, the optimal employment contract eliminates all variations in values and payments and
therefore is globally optimal. The optimality of an employment contract with large acceptance
set, however, does not rely on the fact that it eliminates all losses as it is the case in our simple
setup. The major advantage of an employment contract with a large acceptance set is that it
leads to few fluctuations in the default outcome. In other words, our results still hold true as
long as the variations in costs and valuations for the buyer-preferred, the seller-preferred, and
the materially efficient service are relatively low compared to the variations in costs and values
across these services.
Finally, the reader might wonder to what extent loss aversion is different from risk aversion
within the expected utility framework. A risk-averse buyer would also benefit from a contract
that reduces ex post variations. Nevertheless, there are some important differences between a
risk-averse and an expectation-based loss-averse buyer. Suppose the buyer is risk averse with
utility function V (v − p), where V (·) is increasing and concave. In this case, it can easily be
seen that the materially efficient good is always traded ex post independent of the initial long-
term contract. As for the case with a loss-averse buyer, an employment contract with complete
acceptance set minimizes the variations in vˆ− pˆ, which is desirable also for a risk-averse buyer,
and in turn maximizes the ex ante surplus of the two parties. The reason for the parties to
select an employment contract if the buyer is risk averse is solely to ensure optimal risk sharing.
While a risk-averse buyer is always indifferent between a buyer employment contract and a
seller employment contract, a loss-averse buyer evaluates these contracts differently. Therefore,
if the buyer is loss averse, the parties conclude an employment contract not only in order to
reduce the risk the buyer is exposed to, but also to ensure materially efficient trade ex post.
We consider our model as a first step in gaining insights regarding optimal long-term con-
tracting between expectation-based loss-averse parties. A more thorough analysis—which may
also combine different concepts of reference point formation—is left for future research.
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A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in two steps: First, we show that both sellers stay-
ing in the market is incompatible with SP-PE. The second step, which establishes that the
buyer’s expectations depending on the state of the world are (generically) incompatible with
SP-PE, is deferred to Appendix B.
Suppose that there is a SP-PE with both sellers staying in the market. For staying in the
market to be a mutual best response for both sellers at date 2, expected profits for each seller
from sequentially rational behavior at date 4 given the buyer’s expectations must be at least
pi > 0. This, in turn, implies that the buyer must expect spot contracting in some state θ ∈ Θ
to result in seller 1 offering the delivery of some service x′ at price p′ > c(x′, θ) and himself
accepting that offer with strictly positive probability. Then, however, seller 2, whom the buyer
in state θ ∈ Θ must expect either to make the same offer as seller 1 or to make an offer that the
buyer does not accept, could profitably deviate from the buyer’s expectation by offering service
x′ at price p′ − ε with ε > 0. This offer is accepted by the buyer with certainty and results
in strictly higher profits for seller j because p′ − ε − c(x′, θ) > max{0, [p′ − c(x′, θ)]/2} for
ε sufficiently small. This, however, implies that any SP-PE that has both sellers staying in the
market has to be associated with zero profits for both sellers, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
1{k→j} =
{
1 if vˆk = vj
0 otherwise
(A.1)
denote an indicator function which takes the value one if the buyer expects default outcome
(vk, ck), k ∈ {0, L,H}, to be renegotiated to outcome (vj, cj), j ∈ {0, L,H}, and which takes
the value zero if the buyer expects default outcome (vk, ck) not to be renegotiated to outcome
(vj, cj). By Lemma 1,
∑
j∈{0,L,H} 1{k→j} = 1. Furthermore, let pˆ{k→j} denote the buyer’s
expectation regarding the trade price in case that default outcome (vk, ck) to be renegotiated to
outcome (vj, cj). With this notation, if the buyer holds overall expectations Λ, his utility from
obtaining value v at price p is
U(v, p¯|Λ) = v − p− λ
∑
k∈{0,L,H}
∑
j∈{0,L,H}
Qk1{k→j}
(
[vj − v]+ + [p− pˆ{k→j}]+
)
. (A.2)
The proof, which proceeds by contradiction, is organized in two steps. First, we show that
1{0→0} = 1 is incompatible with SP-PE, i.e., in any SP-PE a worthless default outcome is
renegotiated to the provision of a valuable service. Second, we show that 1{k→0} = 1 is incom-
patible with SP-PE for k ∈ {L,H}, i.e., it will never happen in a SP-PE that a valuable default
outcome is renegotiated to the provision of a worthless service.
(i) Suppose there exists a SP-PE in which the buyer expects the worthless outcome not to be
renegotiated, i.e., 1{0→0} = 1 and pˆ{0→0} = p¯. In case of the realization of a worthless default
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outcome, suppose the seller offers materially efficient renegotiations at price pR > 0 instead of
adhering to the buyer’s expectations. The buyer is willing to accept this renegotiations offer if
U(vL, p
R|Λ) = vL − pR − λ
(
QH1{H→H} +QL1{L→H}
)
[vH − vL]− λQ0[pR − p¯]
− λQH
(
1{H→H}[pR − p¯] + 1{H→L}[pR − pˆ{H→L}] + 1{H→0}[pR − pˆ{H→0}]
)
− λQL
(
1{L→H}[pR − pˆ{L→H}]+ + 1{L→L}[pR − p¯] + 1{L→0}[pR − pˆ{L→0}]
)
(A.3)
(at least weakly) exceeds
U(v0, p¯|Λ) = v0 − p¯− λ
(
QH1{H→H} +QL1{L→H}
)
vH − λ
(
QH1{H→L} +QL1{L→L}
)
vL
− λQH
(
1{H→L}[p¯− pˆ{H→L}] + 1{H→0}[p¯− pˆ{H→0}]
)− λQL1{L→0}[p¯− pˆ{L→0}], (A.4)
or, equivalently,
pR ≤ p¯+ vL + λ
(
QH(1{H→H} + 1{H→L}) +QL(1{L→H} + 1{L→L})
)
vL
− λ (Q0 +QL(1{L→L} + 1{L→0}) +QH) [pR − p¯]− λQL1{L→H}[pR − pˆ{L→H}]+ (A.5)
The seller’s optimal price offer, pR∗ , makes (A.5) just hold with equality. Since pˆL→H > p¯, we
have [pR − pˆ{L→H}]+ < pR − p¯, it holds that
pR
∗
> p¯+ vL − (1 + λ)[pR∗ − p¯] ⇐⇒ pR∗ > p¯+ vL
1 + λ
. (A.6)
From (A.6), together with Assumption 1, we obtain
pR
∗ − cL > p¯, (A.7)
i.e., the seller’s profit from this deviation strictly exceeds her profit from adhering to the buyer’s
expectations. This, however, is incompatible with SP-PE, a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose there exists a SP-PE in which the buyer expects that a valuable default outcome
will be renegotiated to a worthless service, i.e., 1{k→0} = 1 and pˆ{k→0} < p¯ for k ∈ {L,H}).
Moreover, from step (i), we have 1{0→0} = 0. For this to be consistent with SP-PE, the buyer ex-
pects to be indifferent between rejecting the seller’s renegotiation offer, i.e., U(v0, pˆ{k→0}|Λ) =
U(vk, p¯|Λ), where
U(v0, pˆ{k→0}|Λ) = v0 − pˆ{k→0} − λ
(
QH1{H→H} +QL1{L→H} +Q01{0→H}
)
vH
− λ (QH1{H→L} +QL1{L→L} +Q01{0→L}) vL − λQL1{L→0}[pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{L→0}]+
− λQH
(
1{H→L}[pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{H→L}]+ + 1{H→0}[pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{H→0}]+
)
. (A.8)
In case of the realization of default outcome (vk, ck), suppose the seller offers materially ef-
ficient renegotiations at price pR instead of adhering to the buyer’s expectations and offer-
ing the provision of a worthless service. Since default outcome vk is itself valuable, i.e.,
k ∈ {L,H}, provision of the materially efficient service has to come along with a (weak)
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price reduction, i.e., pR ≤ p¯. For the buyer to accept the seller’s renegotiation offer, we must
have U(vL, pR|Λ) ≥ U(vk, p¯|Λ), where
U(vL, p
R|Λ) = vL − pR − λ
(
QH1{H→H} +QL1{L→H} +Q01{0→H}
)
[vH − vL]
− λQL1{L→0}[pR − pˆ{L→0}]+ − λQH
(
1{H→L}[pR − pˆ{H→L}]+ + 1{H→0}[pR − pˆ{H→0}]+
)
.
(A.9)
The seller’s most profitable price to offer in renegotiations, pR∗ , makes the buyer just indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the seller’s offer, i.e., U(vL, pR
∗ |Λ) = U(vk, p¯|Λ). Then, with
U(vL, p
R∗|Λ) = U(v0, pˆ{k→0}|Λ), we have
pR
∗
= pˆ{L→0} + vL
+ λ
(
QH(1{H→H} + 1{H→L}) +QL(1{L→H} + 1{L→L}) +Q0(1{0→H} + 1{0→L})
)
vL
− λQL1{L→0}
(
[pR − pˆ{L→0}]+ − [pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{L→0}]+
)
− λQH1{H→L}
(
[pR − pˆ{H→L}]+ − [pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{H→L}]+
)
− λQH1{H→0}
(
[pR − pˆ{H→0}]+ − [pˆ{k→0} − pˆ{H→0}]+
)
. (A.10)
Note that (A.10) requires pR∗ > pˆ{k→0}. Then, for p˜ ∈ {pˆ{L→0}, pˆ{H→L}, pˆ{H→0}}, we have
[pR
∗ − p˜]+ − [pˆ{k→0} − p˜]+ = pR∗ − pˆ{k→0} if pˆ{k→0} ≥ p˜ and [pR∗ − p˜]+ − [pˆ{k→0} − p˜]+ <
pR
∗ − pˆ{k→0} if pˆ{k→0} < p˜. From (A.10) it then follows that
pR
∗
> pˆ{L→0} + vL − λ
(
QL1{L→0} + λQH(1{H→L} + 1{H→0})
)
(pR
∗ − pˆ{k→0}), (A.11)
which, in turn, implies
pR
∗
> pˆ{L→0} +
vL
1 + λ
. (A.12)
Together with Assumption 1, (A.12) implies
pR
∗ − cL > pˆ{L→0}, (A.13)
i.e., this deviation is indeed more profitable for the seller than adhering to the buyer’s expecta-
tions. This, however, is incompatible with SP-PE, a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof makes use of the notation introduced in the proof of Lemma
2. Suppose the buyer holds expectations Λ potentially consistent with SP-PE, i.e., 1{0→0} =
1{L→0} = 1{H→0} = 0. The proof proceeds in two steps: First, we show that in case of
a worthless default outcome it is never profitable for the seller to deviate from the buyer’s
expectations by not offering renegotiations. Second, in case of a valuable default outcome it is
never profitable for the seller to deviate from the buyer’s expectations by offering renegotiations
to the provision of a worthless service.
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(i) Suppose a worthless default outcome has been realized. The buyer’s utility from this
default outcome is
U(v0, p¯|Λ) = v0 − p¯− λ
(
Q01{0→H} +QL1{L→H} +QH1{H→H}
)
vH
− λ (Q01{0→L} +QL1{L→L} +QH1{H→L}) vL − λQH1{H→L}[p¯− pˆ{H→L}]. (A.14)
On the other hand, the buyer’s utility from accepting materially efficient renegotiations at price
pR > p¯ is
U(vL, p
R|Λ) = vL − pR − λ
(
Q01{0→H} +QL1{L→H} +QH1{H→H}
)
(vH − vL)
− (λQH1{H→H} +QL1{L→L}) [pR − p¯]
− λQH1{H→L}[pR − pˆ{H→L}]− λQL1{L→H}[pR − pˆ{L→H}]+
− λQ01{0→L}[pR − pˆ{0→L}]+ − λQ01{0→H}[pR − pˆ{0→H}]+ (A.15)
Proceeding in exact analogy to part the proof of (i) of Lemma 2 allows to show that the latter
offer is strictly more profitable for the seller than the former.
(ii) Suppose a valuable default outcome vk, k ∈ {L,H}, has been realized. The most prof-
itable renegotiation offer the seller can make that involves provision of a worthless service
comprises a price pR∗0 that equates U(vk, p¯|Λ) and
U(v0, p
R∗
0 |Λ) = v0 − pR
∗
0 − λ
(
Q01{0→H} +QL1{L→H} +QH1{H→H}
)
vH
− λ (Q01{0→L} +QL1{L→L} +QH1{H→L}) vL − λQH1{H→L}[pR∗0 − pˆ{H→L}]. (A.16)
Likewise, the most profitable renegotiation offer the seller can make that involves provision of
materially efficient service comprises a price pR∗L that equates U(vk, p¯|Λ) and
U(vL, p
R∗
L |Λ) = vL − pR
∗
L − λ
(
Q01{0→H} +QL1{L→H} +QH1{H→H}
)
(vH − vL)
− λQH1{H→L}[pR∗L − pˆ{H→L}]+. (A.17)
Proceeding in exact analogy to part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 2 allows to show that the latter
offer is strictly more profitable for the seller than the former.
Proof of Lemma 3. Considering the relevant cases of a small acceptance set and of a seller
employment contract with a medium acceptance set, the proof proceeds by contradiction.
Consider an initial contractC with a small acceptance set, i.e., |A| < (n+1)/2. Suppose vˆ0 =
vL, vˆL = vH , and pˆ0 ≤ pˆL. Note that pˆH ≤ p¯ < pˆ0. In equilibrium, in case of a worthless default
outcome, the buyer is indifferent between accepting the seller’s renegotiation offer, which yields
utility U(vL, pˆ0|Λ(C)) = vL − pˆ0 − λQL(vH − vL) − λQH [vˆH − vL]+ − λQH(pˆ0 − pˆH), and
obtaining his default outcome, which yields utility U(0, p¯|Λ(C)) = −p¯ − λQ0vL − λQLvH −
λQH vˆH − λQH(p¯− pˆH), such that
pˆ0 = p¯+
(1 + λ(Q0 +QL))vL + λQH vˆH − λQH [vˆH − vL]+
1 + λQH
. (A.18)
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Likewise, in equilibrium, in case of a materially efficient default outcome, the buyer is indiffer-
ent between accepting the seller’s renegotiation offer, which yields utility UB(vH , pˆL|Λ(C)) =
vH − pˆL − λQ0(pˆL − pˆ0) − λQH(pˆL − pˆH), and obtaining his default outcome, which yields
utility UB(vL, p¯|Λ(C)) = vL − p¯ − λQL(vH − vL) − λQH [vˆH − vL]+ − λQH(p¯ − pˆH), such
that
pˆL = p¯− λQ0
1− λ(Q0 +QH)(pˆ0 − p¯) +
(1 + λQL)(vH − vL) + λQH [vˆH − vL]+
1 + λ(Q0 +QH)
. (A.19)
Combining (A.18) and (A.19) reveals that
pˆ0 ≤ pˆL ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ (vH − 2vL)(1 +λQL)−λQ0vL + 2λQH [vˆH − vL]+−λQH vˆH . (A.20)
With
2λQH [vˆH − vL]+ − λQH vˆH =
{
−λQH vˆH if vˆH ∈ {0, vL}
λQH(vH − 2vL) if vˆH = vH
}
≤ 0 (A.21)
(A.20) cannot hold, a contradiction. Thus, expectations pˆ0 ≤ pˆL are not compatible with equi-
librium.
For the case of a seller employment contract with a medium acceptance set, i.e, E = S and
|A| ≤ (n+ 1)/2, the result follows from the above derivations by setting QH = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. We rule out all criss-cross expectations the buyer might possibly hold as
potential equilibrium expectations by identifying profitable deviations for the seller. We begin
with the case of a small acceptance set, i.e., for |A| < (n+1)/2. Since, by Lemma 2, a worthless
service will never be provided in equilibrium, we are left with four sets of expectations that
involve criss-cross renegotiations. For the sake of exposition, in the following, we suppress the
dependency of Qk on E and |A|.
CASE 1: vˆ0 ∈ {vL, vH}, vˆL = vH , vˆH = vL
With pˆH < p¯ < pˆL < pˆ0 (cf. Lemma 3), U(vH , pˆL|Λ(C)) = vH − pˆL − λQH(pˆL − pˆH) equals
U(vL, p¯|Λ(C)) = vL − p¯− λQ0(vˆ0 − vL)− λQL(vH − vL)− λQH(p¯− pˆH), or equivalently,
pˆL = p¯+
(1 + λQL)(vH − vL) + λQ0(vˆ0 − vL)
1 + λQH
(vH − vL). (A.22)
Likewise, U(vL, pˆH |Λ(C)) = vL−pˆH−λQ0(vˆ0−vL)−λQL(vH−vL) equals U(vH , p¯|Λ(C)) =
vH − p¯− λQH(p¯− pˆH), or equivalently,
pˆH = p¯− (1 + λQL) + λQ0(vˆ0 − vL)
1 + λQH
(vH − vL). (A.23)
If (cH − cL) > [(vH − vL)(1 + λQL) + λQ0(vˆ0 − vL)]/(1 + λQH), then in case of (vD, cD) =
(vL, cL) it is strictly more profitable for the seller not to offer renegotiation than to offer renego-
tiation to (vH , cH) at price pˆL. If (cH−cL) < [(vH−vL)(1+λQL)+λQ0(vˆ0−vL)]/(1+λQH),
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then in case of (vD, cD) = (vH , cH) it is strictly more profitable for the seller not to offer rene-
gotiation than to offer renegotiation to (vL, cL) at price pˆH . ||
CASE 2: vˆ0 = vH , vˆL = vL, vˆH = vL
With pˆH < p¯ = pˆL < pˆ0, U(vH , pˆ0|Λ(C)) = vH − pˆ0 − λQH(pˆ0 − pˆH)− λQL(pˆ0 − p¯) equals
U(0, p¯|Λ(C)) = −p¯− λQ0vH − λQLvL − λQH(p¯− pˆH), or equivalently,
pˆ0 = p¯+
(1 + λQ0)vH + λ(QL +QH)vL
1 + λ(QL +QH)
. (A.24)
Likewise, UB(vL, pˆH |Λ(C)) = vL − pˆH − λQ0(vH − vL) equals UB(vH , p¯|Λ(C)) = vH − p¯−
λQH(p¯− pˆH), or equivalently,
pˆH = p¯− 1 + λQ0
1 + λQH
(vH − vL). (A.25)
If (cH − cL) < (vH − vL)(1 + λQ0)/(1 + λQH), then in case of (vD, cD) = (vH , cH) it is
strictly more profitable for the seller not to offer renegotiation than to offer renegotiation to
(vL, cL) at price pˆH . If (cH − cL) > (vH − vL)(1 + λQ0)/(1 + λ(QL + QH)), then in case of
(vD, cD) = (0, 0) it is strictly more profitable for the seller to offer renegotiation to (vL, cL) at
price
pR = p¯+
1 + λ
1 + λ(QL +QH)
vL ∈ (p¯, pˆ0), (A.26)
which is accepted by the buyer because U(vL, pR|Λ(C)) = vL−pR−λQ0(vH−vL)−λQH(pR−
pˆH)− λQL(pR− pˆL) equals U(0, p¯|Λ(C)) = −p¯− λQ0vH − λ(QL +QH)vL− λQH(p¯− pˆH),
than to offer renegotiation to (vH , cH) at price pˆ0. ||
CASE 3: vˆ0 = vH , vˆL = vL, vˆH = vH
With pˆL = pˆH = p¯ < pˆ0, U(vH , pˆ0|Λ(C)) = vH − pˆ0 − λ(QL + QH)(pˆ0 − p¯) equals
U(0, p¯|Λ(C)) = −p¯− λQLvL − λ(Q0 +QH)vH , or equivalently,
pˆ0 = p¯+
(1 + λ(Q0 +QH))vH + λQLvL
1 + λ(QL +QH)
. (A.27)
If (cH−cL) > (vH−vL)[1+λ(Q0 +QH)]/[1+λ(QL+QH)], then in case of (vD, cD) = (0, 0)
it is strictly more profitable for the seller to offer renegotiation to (vL, cL) at price
pR = p¯+
1 + λ
1 + λ(QL +QH)
vL ∈ (p¯, pˆ0), (A.28)
which is accepted by the buyer because U(vL, pR|Λ(C)) = vL− pR−λ(Q0 +QH)(vH − vL)−
λ(QL + QH)(p
R − pˆH) equals U(0, p¯|Λ(C)) = −p¯ − λ(Q0 + QH)vH − λQLvL, than to offer
renegotiation to (vH , cH) at price pˆ0. If (cH − cL) < (vH − vL)[1 + λ(Q0 +QH)]/[1 + λ(QL +
QH)], then in case of (vD, cD) = (vL, cL) it is strictly more profitable for the seller to offer
renegotiation to (vH , cH) at price
pR = p¯+
1 + λ(Q0 +QH)
1 + λ(QL +QH)
(vH − vL) ∈ (p¯, pˆ0), (A.29)
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which is accepted by the buyer because U(vH , pR|Λ(C)) = vH − pR − λ(QL +QH)(pR − pˆH)
equals U(vL, p¯|Λ(C)) = vL − p¯− λ(Q0 +QH)(vH − vL), than not to offer renegotiation. ||
For a medium acceptance set, i.e., for |A| = (n + 1)/2, in the light of Lemma 2 there is
only one set of expectations involving criss-cross renegotiations to consider. In case of a seller
employment contract, (vˆ0, vˆL) = (vH , vL) can be ruled out in analogy to CASE 3. The corre-
sponding algebraic expressions are obtained by setting QH = 0. In case of a buyer employment
contract, (vˆL, vˆH) = (vH , vL) can be ruled in analogy to CASE 1. The corresponding algebraic
expressions are obtained by setting Q0 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. With pˆLLLH < pˆ
LLL
L = p¯ < pˆ
LLL
0 , the equilibrium price pˆ
LLL
H in (18) is
obtained by equating U(vL, pˆH |ΛLLL(C)) = vL − pˆLLLH and U(vH , p¯|ΛLLL(C)) = vH − p¯ −
λQH(p¯− pˆLLLH ). Likewise, the equilibrium price pˆLLL0 in (17) is obtained by equating U(vL, pˆ0|
ΛLLL(C)) = vL − pˆLLL0 − λQH(pˆLLL0 − pˆLLLH ) − λQL(pˆLLL0 − p¯) and U(0, p¯|ΛLLL(C)) =
−p¯ − λvL − λQH(p¯ − pˆLLLH ). By Corollary 1, deviations in form of offering provision of a
useless service are never profitable for the seller.
If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (vL, vL), then the highest price pR > p¯ at which the buyer would
accept renegotiation to (vH , cH) is below pˆLLL0 and equates U(vH , p
R|ΛLLL(C)) = vH − pR −
λQL(p
R − p¯) − λQH(pR − pˆLLLH ) and U(vL, p¯|ΛLLL(C)) = vL − p¯ − λQH(p¯ − pˆLLLH ), i.e.,
pR = p¯+ (vH − vL)/[1 + λ(QL +QH)]. Offering this deviation, however, is not profitable for
the seller because pR − p¯ = (vH − vL)/[1 + λ(QL +QH)] < cH − cL.
If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (0, 0), then the highest price pR > p¯ at which the buyer would accept
renegotiation to (vH , cH) is higher than pˆLLL0 and equates U(vH , p
R|ΛLLL(C)) = vH − pR −
λQH(p
R − pˆLLLH ) − λQL(pR − p¯) − λQ0(pR − pˆLLL0 ) and U(0, p¯|ΛLLL(C)) = −p¯ − λvL −
λQH(p¯− pˆLLLH ), i.e., pR = pˆLLL0 + [vH − vL]/(1 + λ). Offering this deviation, however, is not
profitable for the seller because pR − pˆLLL0 = (vH − vL)/(1 + λ) < cH − cL.
If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (vH , cH), then not offering renegotiations is not profitable because
p¯− pˆLLLH = (vH − vL)/[1 + λQH ] < cH − cL.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the result in several steps. For the sake of exposition, in the
following, we suppress the dependency of Qk on E and |A|.
STEP 1: ΛLLH IS CONSISTENT WITH SP-PE IF AND ONLY IF λ ≥ λ˜E,A.
With pˆLLHH = pˆ
LLH
L = p¯ < pˆ
LLH
0 , the equilibrium price pˆ
LLH
0 in (21) is obtained by equat-
ing U(vL, pˆ0| ΛLLH(C)) = vL − pˆLLH0 − λQH(vH − vL) − λ(QL + QH)(pˆLLH0 − p¯) and
U(0, p¯|ΛLLH(C)) = −p¯ − λ(Q0 + QL)vL − λQHvH . By Corollary 1, deviations in form of
offering provision of a useless service are never profitable for the seller.
If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (vL, vL), then the highest price pR > p¯ at which the buyer would accept
renegotiation to (vH , cH) is below pˆLLH0 and equates U(vH , p
R|ΛLLH(C)) = vH−pR−λ(QL+
QH)(p
R − p¯) and U(vL, p¯|ΛLLH(C)) = vL− p¯− λQH(vH − vL), i.e. pR = p¯+ (vH − vL)(1 +
λQH)/[1 + λ(QL + QH)]. Offering this deviation, however, is not profitable for the seller
because pR − p¯ = (vH − vL)(1 + λQH)/[1 + λ(QL +QH)] < cH − cL.
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If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (0, 0), then the highest price pR > p¯ at which the buyer would accept
renegotiation to (vH , cH) is higher than pˆLLH0 and equates U(vH , p
R|ΛLLH(C)) = vH − pR −
λ(QL+QH)(p
R−p¯)−λQ0(pR−pˆLLH0 ) and U(0, p¯|ΛLLH(C)) = −p¯−λ(Q0+QL)vL−λQHvH ,
i.e. pR = p¯+ (pˆLLH0 − barp)λQ0/(1 +λ) + [(1 +λQH)vH +λ(Q0 +QL)vL]/(1 +λ). Offering
this deviation, however, is not profitable for the seller because pR − pˆLLH0 = (vH − vL)[1 −
λ(Q0 +QL)]/(1 + λ) < cH − cL.
If (vD(C), cD(C)) = (vH , cH), then the highest price pR < p¯ at which the buyer would
accept renegotiation to (vL, cL) equates U(vL, pR|ΛLLH(C)) = vL − pR − λQH(vH − vL) and
U(vH , p¯|ΛLLH(C)) = vH−p¯, i.e. pR = p¯−(1+λQH)(vH−vL). Offering this deviation is more
profitable for the seller than not to offer renegotiation if p¯−pR = (1+λQH)(vH−vL) < cH−cL.
Thus, λ ≥ λ˜E,A or, equivalently,
cH − cL
vH − vL ≤ 1 + λQH(E,A). (A.30)
is a necessary and sufficient condition for expectations ΛLLH to be consistent with SP-PE. ||
STEP 2: NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ΛLHH TO BE CONSISTENT WITH SP-PE.
Consider expectations Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vL, pˆLHH0 ), (vH , pˆLHHL ), (vH , p¯)} = ΛLHH . With
pˆLHHH = p¯ < pˆ
LHH
L < pˆ
LHH
0 , the expected price pˆ
LHH
L is obtained by equating U(vH , pˆ
LHH
L |
ΛLHH) = vH− pˆLHHL −λQH(pˆLHHL − p¯) and U(vL, p¯|ΛLHH) = vL− p¯−λ(QL+QH)(vH−vL),
which yields
pˆLHHL = p¯+
1 + λ(QL +QH)
1 + λQH
(vH − vL). (A.31)
The expected price pˆLHH0 is obtained by equating U(vL, pˆ
LHH
0 |ΛLHH) = vL− pˆLHH0 − λ(QL +
QH)(vH − vL)−λQL(pˆLHH0 − pˆLHHL )−λQH(pˆLHH0 − p¯) and U(0, p¯|ΛLHH) = −p¯−λQ0vL−
λ(QL +QH)vH , which yields
pˆLHH0 = pˆ
LHH
L +
{
1 + λ
1 + λ(QL +QH)
vL − (vH − vL)
}
(A.32)
In case of the materially efficient default outcome (vL, cL) it is strictly more profitable for the
seller not to offer renegotiation than to offer renegotiation to (vH , cH) at price pˆL if p¯ − cL >
pˆL − cH , or equivalently, (cH − cL) > (vH − vL)[1 + λ(QL +QH)]/(1 + λQH). Thus,
cH − cL
vH − vL ≤
1 + λ(QL +QH)
1 + λQH
. (A.33)
is a necessary condition for expectations ΛLHH to be consistent with SP-PE. ||
STEP 3: NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ΛHHH TO BE CONSISTENT WITH SP-PE.
Consider expectations Λ(CE,A(p¯)) = {(vH , pˆHHH0 ), (vH , pˆHHHL ), (vH , p¯)} =: ΛHHH . With
pˆHHHH = p¯ < pˆ
HHH
L < pˆ
HHH
0 , the equilibrium price pˆ
HHH
L is obtained by equatingU(vH , pˆ
HHH
L |
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ΛHHH) = vH − pˆHHHL − λQH(pˆHHHL − p¯) and U(vL, p¯|ΛHHH) = vL− p¯− λ(vH − vL), which
yields
pˆHHHL = p¯+
1 + λ
1 + λQH
(vH − vL). (A.34)
The equilibrium price pˆHHH0 is obtained by equating U(vH , pˆ
HHH
0 |ΛHHH) = vH − pˆHHH0 −
λQL(pˆ
HHH
0 − pˆHHHL )− λQH(pˆHHH0 − p¯) and U(0, p¯|ΛHHH) = −p¯− λvH , which yields
pˆHHH0 = pˆ
HHH
L +
1 + λ
1 + λ(QL +QH)
vL. (A.35)
In case of the useless default outcome (0, 0) it is strictly more profitable for the seller to offer
renegotiation to (vL, cL) at price
pR = p¯ +
λQL
[1 + λ(QL +QH)]
(1 + λ)
(1 + λQH)
(vH − vL) + (1 + λ)
1 + λ(QL +QH)
vL ∈ (pˆL, pˆH),
(A.36)
which is accepted by the buyer because U(vL, pR|ΛHHH) = vL−pR−λ(vH−vL)−λQL(pR−
pˆL)− λQH(pR − p¯) equals U(0, p¯|ΛHHH), than to offer renegotiation to (vH , cH) at price pˆL if
pR − cL > pˆ0 − cH , or equivalently, (cH − cL) > (vH − vL)(1 + λ)/(1 + λ(QL +QH)). Thus,
cH − cL
vH − vL ≤
1 + λ
1 + λ(QL +QH)
. (A.37)
is a necessary condition for expectations ΛHHH to be consistent with SP-PE. ||
STEP 4: COMPARISON OF EXISTENCE CONDITIONS.
The condition (A.30) for expectations ΛLLH to be consistent with SP-PE is less restrictive than
the corresponding condition (A.33) for expectations ΛLHH if and only if 1 + λQH ≥ [1 +
λ(QL +QH)]/(1 + λQH), or equivalently, (1 + λQH)QH ≥ QL. Note that this latter condition
holds if QH ≥ QL, which in particular is the case for QH ≥ 1/2.
The condition (A.30) for expectations ΛLLH to be consistent with SP-PE is less restrictive
than the existence corresponding (A.37) for expectations ΛHHH if and only if 1 + λQH ≥
(1 + λ)/[1 + λ(QL + QH)], or equivalently, 2QH + QL + λQH(QL + QH) ≥ 1. Note that
QH ≥ 1/2 is sufficient for this condition to be satisfied. ||
STEP 5: NEITHER ΛLHH NOR ΛHHH CONSTITUTES THE SP-PPE.
The buyer’s expected utility under expectations ΛLHH and ΛHHH is
EU(ΛLHH) = vL − p¯−Q0(1 + λ)vL + [QH(1− λ(1−QH))− λQL(1−QH)](vH − vL)
(A.38)
and
EU(ΛHHH) = vL − p¯−Q0(1 + λ)vL + [1− (1 + λ)(1−QH)](vH − vL), (A.39)
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respectively. Comparison of (22), (A.38), and (A.39) reveals that EU(ΛLLH) ≥
max{EU(ΛLHH), EU(ΛHHH)}whenever all three sets of expectations are consistent with sub-
sequently rational behavior. Thus, from STEP 4 it follows that for QH ≥ 1/2 the buyer’s
preferred personal equilibrium is neither ΛLHH nor ΛHHH .
Comparison of (19) and (A.39) reveals that EU(ΛLLL) > EU(ΛHHH) if and only if
1− (1 + λ)(1−QH) < QH 1− λ(1−QH)
1 + λQH
⇐⇒ QH [1− λ(1−QH)] < 1−QH , (A.40)
which clearly holds for QH < 1/2.
Comparison of (19) and (A.38) reveals that EU(ΛLLL) > EU(ΛLHH) if and only if
1 ≥ QH
1−QH ·
1− λ(1−QH)
(1 + λQH)
· QH
QL
(A.41)
Thus, ΛLHH is not the buyer’s SP-PPE for QH < 1/2 if QL ≥ QH . Moreover, from the
observation above in combination with STEP 4, we know ΛLHH is not the buyer’s SP-PPE for
QH < 1/2 if QL < QH because EU(ΛLLH) ≥ EU(ΛLHH). ||
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose for |A| < (n + 1)/2. Part (i) is trivial. Part (ii) follows from
the definition of λ˜E,A in (15) together with the fact that Q(E,A) = (n− 1)/2n is increasing in
n.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proofs of i) and ii) are provided in the main text with λ˜E,A being
determined by (A.30) with QH = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of this proposition is provided in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 6. In general, the desired result is established in analogy to the proofs of
Propositions 2 and 3.
(i) For E = B, the default outcome will never be a worthless service. Therefore, when we
make references to earlier established results, set Q0 = 0 and ignore all derivations for the case
of a worthless default outcome.
Regarding ΛLLB , following along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2, the renegotiated trade
price pˆLLH and the buyer’s expected utility EU(Λ
LL) correspond to (18) and (19), respectively.
Regarding ΛLHB , following along the lines of STEP 1 in the proof of Proposition 3, the buyer’s
expected utility EU(ΛLH) and the condition for ΛLHB to be consistent with SP-PE correspond
to (22) and (A.30), respectively.
Regarding ΛHHB , following along the lines of STEP 2 in the proof of Proposition 3, the rene-
gotiated trade price pˆHHL , the buyer’s expected utility EU(Λ
HH), and the condition for ΛHHB to
be consistent with SP-PE correspond to (A.31), (A.38), and (A.33), respectively.
Finally, similar to STEP 4 and STEP 5 of Proposition 3, the following can be shown: first, the
buyer’s expected utility is higher under ΛLHB than under Λ
LL
B and Λ
HH
B ; second, for QH ≥ 1/2,
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ΛLHB is consistent with SP-PE whenever Λ
HH
B is consistent with SP-PE; third, for QH ≥ 1/2,
the buyer’s expected utility is higher under ΛLLB than under Λ
HH
B .
(ii) For E = S, the default outcome will never be a high-value/high-cost service. Therefore,
when we make references to earlier established results, set QH = 0 and ignore all derivations
for the case of a high-value/high-cost default outcome.
Regarding ΛLLS , following along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2, the renegotiated trade
price pˆLL0 and the buyer’s expected utility EU(Λ
LL) correspond to (17) and (19), respectively.
Regarding ΛLHS , following along the lines of STEP 2 in the proof of Proposition 3, the rene-
gotiated trade prices pˆLHL and pˆ
LH
0 and the buyer’s expected utility EU(Λ
LH) correspond to
(A.31), (A.32), and (A.38), respectively.
Regarding ΛHHS , following along the lines of STEP 3 in the proof of Proposition 3, the rene-
gotiated trade prices pˆHHL and pˆ
HH
0 and the buyer’s expected utility EU(Λ
HH) correspond to
(A.34), (A.35), and (A.39), respectively.
Finally, it can be shown that the buyer’s expected utility is higher under ΛLLS than under Λ
LH
S
and ΛHHS .
Proof of Proposition 7. The statement follows from the Bertrand nature of seller competition at
the initial stage at which long–term contract offers are made, together with Proposition 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we prove the main claim of the proposition, i.e., C = CB,A(p¯)
with |A| = (n+ 1)/2 maximizes the buyer’s willingness to invest. Note that, for λ ≤ λ˜B,L(0),
materially efficient renegotiation occurs for all I ∈ {0, 1} and all A ⊆ X . This holds true be-
cause by (15), we have (i) λ˜E,A(0) < λ˜E,A(1) for allA and all E, and (ii) λ˜E,A(0) is decreasing
in QH(E,A) and thus lowest for QH = 1—i.e, for a buyer employment contract with large
acceptance set.
Next, we show that if λ ≤ λ˜B,L(0), the threshold of investment costs is largest for a buyer
employment contract with medium acceptance set. In order to cut back on notation, let
∆k := vk(1)− vk(0), (A.42)
for k ∈ {L,H}. Consider a buyer employment contract with a small (or medium) acceptance
set. In the following, we make use of the shortcut notation Qk(s) for Qk(E,A|s). As argued in
the main text, ψB,S(s, λ)—defined by (47)—is decreasing in s, which holds true because
∂ψB,S(s, λ)
∂s
=−Q′0(s)(1 + λ)∆L − (∆L −∆H)
Q′H(s)− λQ′H(s) + 2QHλQ′H(s)
(1 + λQH)2
=−Q′0(s)
[
∆H
1− λ+ 2QH
(1 + λQH)2
+ ∆L
(
1 + λ− 1− λ+ 2QH
(1 + λQH)2
)]
< 0. (A.43)
Note that −Q′H(s) = Q′0(s) = 1/n.
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Thus, ψB,S(s, λ) is maximized at s = 0, where s = 0 corresponds to a medium acceptance
set. In addition, ψB,S(s = 0, λ) is larger than the threshold of investment costs, ψB,L(λ), under
a buyer employment contract with a large acceptance set. From (45) and (47), it follows that
ψB,S(s = 0, λ) ≥ ψB,L(λ) (A.44)
⇐⇒ 1
1 + λ
≥ QH 1− λ+ λQH
1 + λQH
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ −(1−QH)(1 + λQH + λ2QH).
In order to conclude this part of the proof it remains to be shown that a seller employment
contract never leads to higher investment incentives. Tedious but straightforward calculations—
which are omitted—reveal that the critical investment threshold under a seller employment
contract, ψS,A(·), is always below the threshold for a buyer employment contract with large
acceptance set. Formally, ψS,A(·) ≤ ψB,L for all A ⊆ X and all λ ≥ 0. Thus, for λ ≤ λ˜B,L(0),
the threshold of investment costs ψB,S(s = 0, λ) is the largest threshold.
To prove the second part of the proposition, it remains to be established that the set of in-
vestment costs for which the buyer invests under a buyer employment contract with a small
acceptance set is increasing in his degree of loss aversion if |A| is sufficiently large. By (47) it
holds that
∂ψB,S(k, λ)
∂λ
=−QH−(1−QH)(1 + λQH)−QH(1− λ(1−QH))
(1 + λQH)2
(∆L −∆H)−Q0∆L
=− QH
(1 + λQH)2
[
∆H + ∆L
(
Q0
QH
(1 + λQH)
2 − 1
)]
=− QH
(1 + λQH)2
[
∆H + ∆L
(
s
n− 1− s(1 + λQH)
2 − 1
)]
. (A.45)
From the above derivative, we immediately obtain
∂ψB,S(s, λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
s=0
=
QH
(1 + λQH)2
(∆L −∆H) > 0 (A.46)
and
∂ψB,S(s, λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
s=n−1
2
=− QH
(1 + λQH)2
(
∆H + ∆L(2λQH + λ
2Q2H)
)
< 0. (A.47)
Moreover,
∂2ψB,S(s, λ)
∂s∂λ
=− 1
n
(
(∆L −∆H) 1− λQH
(1 + λQH)3
+ ∆L
)
< 0. (A.48)
This proves the second part of the proposition.
B. REMARKS ON GENERICITY
Proof of Proposition 1. Step 2: We establish that the buyer’s expectations depending on the
state of the world are generically incompatible with SP-PE.
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Suppose the buyer expects only one seller to stay in the market. As we have argued in the
text, it is incompatible with SP-PE for the buyer to expect to obtain a zero value in all states of
the world. It remains to establish that, for given expectations Λ(∅) with vˆ(θ,∅) 6= 0 for some
θ ∈ Θ, a monopoly seller (generically) will offer one and the same spot contract in each state of
the world. According to (7), the buyer’s utility from accepting a spot contract resulting in value
v at price p does not depend on which state of the world has been realized at date 3. Therefore, if
the buyer expects different contract offers in different states of the world, he has to expect these
offers to result in identical profits for the seller, i.e., (vˆ(θ′,∅), pˆ(θ′,∅)) 6= (vˆ(θ′′,∅), pˆ(θ′′,∅))
implies pˆ(θ′,∅)− cˆ(θ′,∅) = pˆ(θ′′,∅)− cˆ(θ′′,∅). Otherwise the seller would have an incentive
to deviate from the buyer’s expectations by making the most profitable offer in each state of
the world. As argued in the text, zero value is always associated with a zero expected price. It
follows that in equilibrium the buyer cannot expect spot contracting to result in zero value in
any state of the world: with expected profits from spot contracting equal to zero in this case, the
seller would have left the market at date 2 to pursue her outside option.
Thus, suppose the buyer expects to obtain value vL for states in some strict subset ΘL ⊂ Θ
of the state space, and to obtain value vH for the states in the complementary set ΘH = Θ \ΘL.
Let Qˆk = |Θk|/n denote the probability with which the buyer expects to obtain value vk with
k ∈ {L,H}. By the reasoning above, the buyers price expectations have to satisfy pˆ(θ′,∅) = pL
for all θ′ ∈ ΘL, pˆ(θ′′,∅) = pH for all θ′′ ∈ ΘH , and pL − cL = pH − cH . For the buyer’s
expectations to be consistent with equilibrium, he must expect his utility from both spot contract
offers, (vL, pL) and (vH , pH), to be at least as high as his utility from spot contracting not taking
place, i.e.,
U(vL, pL|Λ(∅)) = vL − pL − λQˆH(vH − vL) ≥ −λ(QˆLvL + QˆHvH) (B.1)
and
U(vH , pH |Λ(∅)) = vH − pH − λQˆL(pH − pL)
= vH − pL − (1 + λQˆL)(cH − cL) ≥ −λ(QˆLvL + QˆHvH). (B.2)
Finally, for the seller not to have an incentive to deviate by slightly increasing the price in states
θ ∈ ΘL or states θ ∈ ΘH , both (B.1) and (B.2) have to be binding. Since U(vL, pL|Λ(∅)) =
U(vH , pH |Λ(∅)) if and only if
(cH − cL)− (vH − vL) = λ[QˆH(vH − vL)− QˆL(cH − cL)], (B.3)
this last requirement, however, generically fails to hold because (B.3) is satisfied for at most
one value of λ.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given contractCE,A(p¯), each state θ ∈ Θ is associated with a unique default
outcome (vD(θ, C), cD(θ, C)). With our focus on pure strategies, the buyer expects renegotia-
tions in state θ to result in a particular outcome (vˆ(θ, C), cˆ(θ, C)).
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Letting Λ(C) denote the buyer’ expectations consistent with equilibrium for a given contract
C = CE,A(p¯), a first observation is that if renegotiations occur in state θ ∈ Θ, then the seller’s
renegotiation offer makes the buyer just indifferent between the default outcome and the rene-
gotiated outcome, i.e., U(vˆ(θ, C), pˆ(θ, C)|Λ(C)) = U(vD(θ, C), p¯|Λ(C)). If the buyer was not
indifferent, then either he would reject the seller’s renegotiation offer or the seller could prof-
itably deviate by offering the outcome (vˆ(θ, C), cˆ(θ, C)) at a slightly higher price which the
buyer nevertheless would accept.
The above observation has two immediate implications. First, if the buyer expects renegoti-
ation to lead to the same value to be implemented in two states with the same default outcome,
then he has to expect the same price to be offered by the the seller in renegotiations. Formally,
if vˆ(θ′, C) = vˆ(θ′′, C) for θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ with vD(θ′, C) = vD(θ′′, C), then pˆ(θ′, C) = pˆ(θ′′, C).
Second, if the buyer expects renegotiations in two states with different default outcomes to re-
sult in the same outcome with either strictly higher or strictly lower value than the two default
outcomes, then the buyer has to expect renegotiations involving higher differences in value to
lead to a larger change in the trade price. Formally, if vˆ(θ′, C) = vˆ(θ′′, C) = 0 for θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ
with vD(θ′, C) = vL and vD(θ′′, C) = vH or vˆ(θ′, C) = vˆ(θ′′, C) = vH for θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ with
vD(θ′, C) = 0 and vD(θ′′, C) = vL, then pˆ(θ′, C) > pˆ(θ′′, C).
Armed with these observations, we can establish that the buyer’s expectation in equilibrium
about the outcome of renegotiations after state θ ∈ Θ has been realized is fully determined by
the default outcome (vD(θ, C), cD(θ, C)). For k, j ∈ {0, L,H}, define
Θ{k→j} := {θ ∈ Θ|vD(θ, C) = vk, vˆ(θ, C) = vj} (B.4)
to be the set of states of the world that share the same default outcome under contract C and that
the buyer expects to be identically renegotiated. Due to our focus on pure strategies, Θ{k→j′} ∩
Θ{k→j′′} = ∅ for j′ 6= j′′. Furthermore, define
Q{k→j} :=
|Θ{k→j}|
n
. (B.5)
From the discussion above, for all θ ∈ Θ{k→j} the buyer expects the seller to offer the same
price pˆ{k→j} in renegotiations, where pˆ{k→k} = p¯.
Whenever Θ{k→j′} 6= ∅ and Θ{k→j′′} 6= ∅, the buyer expects the seller to be indifferent
between offering vj′ at price pˆ{k→j′} and offering vj′′ at price pˆ{k→j′′} if her default is to sell
vk at price p¯. If this was not the case, i.e. if (w.l.o.g.) pˆ{k→j′} − cj′ > pˆ{k→j′′} − ck′′ , then
for θ ∈ Θ{k→j′′} the seller could offer vj′ at a price pˆ{k→j′} − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small,
thereby making the buyer strictly prefer to obtain vj′ at price pˆ{k→j′}− ε while at the same time
strictly increasing her profits. This indifference of the seller has the following implications for
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the buyer’s expectations regarding prices:
Θ{H→H} 6= ∅,Θ{H→L} 6= ∅ ⇒ p¯− cH = pˆ{H→L} − cL
Θ{H→H} 6= ∅,Θ{H→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ p¯− cH = pˆ{H→0}
Θ{H→L} 6= ∅,Θ{H→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{H→L} − cL = pˆ{H→0}
Θ{L→H} 6= ∅,Θ{L→L} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{L→H} − cH = p¯− cL
Θ{L→H} 6= ∅,Θ{L→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{L→H} − cH = pˆ{L→0}
Θ{L→L} 6= ∅,Θ{L→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ p¯− cL = pˆ{L→0}
Θ{0→H} 6= ∅,Θ{0→L} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{0→H} − cH = pˆ{0→L} − cL
Θ{0→H} 6= ∅,Θ{0→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{0→H} − cH = p¯
Θ{0→L} 6= ∅,Θ{0→0} 6= ∅ ⇒ pˆ{0→L} − cL = p¯
At the same time, in equilibrium we have U(vj′ , pˆ{k→j′}|Λ(C)) = U(vk′′ , pˆ{k→j′′}|Λ(C)), i.e.,
the buyer expects to be indifferent between obtaining vj′ at price pˆ{k→j′} and obtaining vj′′ at
price pˆ{k→j′} if the default is to obtain vk at price p¯. It can be shown that this latter indifference
of the buyer is characterized by the zeros of a polynomial in λ of finite order, and thus, with λ
being drawn from the interval (0, 1], generically does not hold. With the procedure being the
same for all relevant cases, we demonstrate the result only for two example cases.
CASE 1: Suppose that Θ{H→H} 6= ∅, Θ{H→L} 6= ∅, Θ{L→L} 6= ∅, Θ{0→0} 6= ∅, and
Θ{H→0} = Θ{L→H} = Θ{L→0} = Θ{0→H} = Θ{0→L} = ∅. Regarding the relevant price
expectations we have pˆ{H→H} = pˆ{L→L} = pˆ{0→0} = p¯ and pˆ{H→L} = p¯−(cH−cL). Moreover,
we have that U(vL, pˆ{H→L}|Λ(C)) = vL − [p¯ − (cH − cL)] − λQ{H→H}(vH − vL) equals
U(vH , p¯|Λ(C)) = vH − p¯− λQ{H→L}[p¯− (p¯− (cH − cL))], or equivalently,
(cH − cL)− (vH − vL) = λ{Q{H→H}(vH − vL)−Q{H→L}(cH − cL)}. (B.6)
If at all, (B.6) holds for at most one value of λ and thus generically is not satisfied.
CASE 2: Suppose that Θ{H→L} 6= ∅, Θ{H→0} 6= ∅, Θ{L→L} 6= ∅, Θ{L→0} 6= ∅, Θ{H→H} =
∅, and Θ{L→H}, Θ{0→H}, Θ{0→L}, Θ{0→0} arbitrarily specified. Regarding the relevant price
expectations we have pˆ{H→0} = pˆ{H→L} − cL < pˆ{H→L} < p¯, pˆ{L→0} = p¯ − cL < p¯ =
pˆ{L→L}, and pˆ{L→H}, pˆ{0→H}, pˆ{0→L}, pˆ{0→0} ≥ p¯. Remember, from the discussion above, we
know that pˆ{H→0} < pˆ{L→0}. Suppose that pˆ{H→L} > pˆ{L→0}. In equilibrium, we have that
U(vL, pˆ{H→L}|Λ(C)) = vL− pˆ{H→L}−λ(Q{L→H}+Q{0→H})(vH−vL)−λQ{H→0}(pˆ{H→L}−
pˆ{H→0}) − λQ{L→0}(pˆ{H→L} − pˆ{L→0}) equals U(vH , p¯|Λ(C)) = vH − p¯ − λQ{H→0}(p¯ −
pˆ{H→L})− λQ{L→0}(p¯− pˆ{L→0})− λQ{H→L}(p¯− pˆ{H→L}) such that
pˆ{H→L} = p¯−
1 + λ(Q{L→H} +Q{0→H})
1 + λ(Q{H→0} +Q{L→0} +Q{H→L})
(vH − vL), (B.7)
and in consequence,
pˆ{H→0} = pˆ{H→L} − cL = p¯− cL −
1 + λ(Q{L→H} +Q{0→H})
1 + λ(Q{H→0} +Q{L→0} +Q{H→L})
(vH − vL), (B.8)
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Given these beliefs are feasible in the sense that pˆ{H→0} < pˆ{L→0} < pˆ{H→L}, then
U(0, pˆ{H→0}|Λ(C)) = −pˆ{H→0}−λ(Q{H→L}+Q{L→L}+Q{0→L})vL−λ(Q{L→H}+Q{0→H})vH
equalsU(vH , p¯|Λ(C)) = vH−p¯−λQ{H→0}(p¯−pˆ{H→0})−λQ{H→L}(p¯−pˆ{H→L})−λQ{L→0}(p¯−
pˆ{L→0}), which is equivalent to
(vH − cL) + λ(Q{H→0} +Q{L→0} +Q{H→L})(vH − cL) =
[1 + λ(Q{L→H} +Q{0→H})][1 + λ(Q{H→0} +Q{H→L})](vH − vL)
− λ[1 + λ(Q{H→0} +Q{L→0} +Q{H→L})]{(Q{H→L} +Q{L→L} +Q{0→L})vL
+ (Q{L→H} +Q{0→H})vH − (Q{H→0} +Q{L→0})cL}. (B.9)
If at all, (B.9) holds for at most two values of λ and thus generically is not satisfied.
C. DEFINITION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
Definition 1. A Subgame Pefect Personal Equilibrium (SP-PE) is a strategy profile for each
player P ∈ (S1, S2, B) with the property that (i) in no subgame can any player P do better
by choosing a different strategy, keeping the strategies of all other players fixed, (ii) player B’s
strategy constitutes a personal equilibrium—i.e., correctly anticipating equilibrium play at date
1, which determines B’s reference point in the value and the money dimension, it is optimal for
the buyer to behave according to this strategy at date 5. More precisely, at each date players
behave as follows:
5.) In the subgame following the acceptance of Si’s long-term contract offer, the buyer de-
cides whether or not to accept the renegotiation offer proposed by Si. In the subgame
following the buyer’s rejection of all long-term contract offers, the buyer decides whether
or not to accept exactly one of the proposed spot contracts. The buyer’s decision maxi-
mizes his utility induced by the reference point formed at date 1. When being indifferent
between accepting and rejecting an offer, the buyer accepts the offer. When being indif-
ferent which offer to accept, the buyer chooses the offer that gives him the highest value
in the value dimension. Further ties are broken by the flip of a fair coin by B.
4.) If seller Si’s long-term contract was accepted at date 1, she makes a renegotiation offer
(xR, pR) ∈ X×R. The seller makes a profit-maximizing offer, takingB’s behavior at date
5 into account—in particular, the seller correctly anticipates the personal equilibrium
played by the buyer.
If no long-term contract was concluded at date 1, a seller active in the market proposes
a spot contract (xspot, pspot) ∈ X × R. Active sellers make their offers simultaneously
and non-cooperatively. Each seller makes an offer that maximizes her expected profits—
correctly anticipating the other seller’s offer and the buyer’s behavior at date 5—again,
correctly anticipating the personal equilibrium played by the buyer.
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3.) Nature draws the state of the world θi ∈ Θ, where each state θi with i = 1, . . . , n is
drawn with probability 1/n.
2.) Only in the subgame following the rejection of all long-term contract offers at date 1,
there is a decision to be made at date 2. Both sellers simultaneously and non-cooperatively
decide whether or not to stay in the market. Each seller takes the other seller’s strategy
as given and correctly anticipates subsequent play. A seller leaving the market realizes a
profit of p¯i.
1.) The buyer observes the contracts offered by the two sellers. He either accepts exactly one
contract or he rejects both contracts. In evaluating each option the buyer correctly takes
into account subsequent play by the sellers. Moreover, the buyer’s rational expectations
about subsequent play for each option form a reference point if he executes this option.
This reference point shapes the buyer’s utility at date 5 and therefore influences his be-
havior at date 5. The buyer’s reference plan has to be consistent with his behavior at
date 5—i.e., the plan has to constitute a personal equilibrium (PE). For each available
option the buyer forms a credible reference plan. For option C ∈ {CE,A(p¯),∅}, we call
any such credible plan a subgame perfect personal equilibrium (SP-PE) for the subgame
beginning with the choice of option C. The buyer then selects at date 1 the option that
maximizes his expected utility for these given credible reference plans. If the buyer ac-
cepts the contract offered by Si, then Sj , j 6= i, leaves the market and realizes a profit of
p¯i. If both offers are rejected, the two sellers stay in the market.
0.) Each seller proposes simultaneously and non-cooperatively a long-term contractCE,A(p¯)
to the buyer, thereby taking the other seller’s offer as given. In equilibrium, each seller’s
expectation regarding the other seller’s offer is correct. In addition, each seller cor-
rectly anticipates subsequent play of all players. In particular, each seller correctly
anticipates—for any feasible contract offer—the personal equilibrium played by the buyer—
given that the buyer accepts this contract offer or that he rejects all contract offers.
Definition 2. A Subgame Pefect Preferred Personal Equilibrium (SP-PPE) is a Subgame Perfect
Personal Equilibrium, where the buyer chooses at date 1 for each available option the credible
plan that maximizes his expected utility—i.e, the preferred personal equilibrium. Date 1 is
modified as follows:
1.) The buyer observes the contracts offered by the two sellers. He either accepts exactly one
contract or he rejects both contracts. In evaluating each option the buyer correctly takes
into account subsequent play by the sellers. Moreover, the buyer’s rational expectations
about subsequent play for each option form a reference point if he executes this option.
This reference point shapes the buyer’s utility at date 5 and therefore influences his date
5 behavior. The buyer’s reference plan has to be consistent with his date 5 behavior—
i.e., the plan has to constitute a personal equilibrium (PE). For each available option the
buyer selects the plan that maximizes his expected utility among all credible plans—i.e.,
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the preferred PE plan (PPE). For option C ∈ {CE,A(p¯),∅}, we call the most preferred
credible plan the subgame perfect preferred personal equilibrium (SP-PPE) for the sub-
game beginning with the choice of option C. The buyer then selects at date 1 the option
that maximizes his expected utility for these preferred personal equilibrium plans. If the
buyer accepts the contract offered by Si, then Sj , j 6= i, leaves the market and realizes a
profit of p¯i. If both offers are rejected, the two sellers stay in the market.
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